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IMAGE IS EVERYTHING: CORPORATE BRANDING AND 
RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN THE WORKPLACE 
DALLAN F. FLAKE† 
There is growing tension in the law between an employee’s right to religious 
expression in the workplace and an employer’s countervailing right to cultivate its 
corporate image. The existing case law provides little meaningful guidance to 
employers and employees faced with this conflict. Not only do outcomes vary from 
court to court, but the analysis and reasoning underlying these decisions are often 
inconsistent, and sometimes contradictory. I argue that because a company’s image 
is one of its most valuable assets, courts should more closely scrutinize religious 
accommodation claims that interfere with a company’s ability to control its image. 
Such enhanced scrutiny does not require a break from Supreme Court precedent; 
rather, it requires stricter adherence thereto. I offer three recommendations for how 
courts can recalibrate their analyses of religious accommodation cases involving 
corporate image concerns. These recommendations should help produce a more 
balanced case law that better harmonizes with Supreme Court precedent, while 
providing employers and employees greater clarity in navigating this sensitive and 
complex issue.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Several high-profile companies have recently come under fire for refusing 
to accommodate their employees’ religious expression in the workplace out 
of concern that such accommodations would compromise the companies’ 
public image. Abercrombie & Fitch,1 Costco,2 Home Depot,3 Wal-Mart,4 
and Disney5 are just some of the companies to have taken this position. 
Disney was recently embroiled in a highly contentious lawsuit with a 
Muslim ex-employee, who lost her job as a hostess at a Disneyland café for 
insisting on wearing a hijab, or headscarf, at work in violation of Disney’s 
dress code.6 The employee rejected as unreasonable Disney’s attempts to 
accommodate her by either allowing her to wear a hat on top of her hijab or 
 
1 See generally EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie IV), 966 F. Supp. 2d 
949 (N.D. Cal. 2013); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie III), No. 10-3911, 
2013 WL 1435290 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2013); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie II), 
798 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (N.D. Okla. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. 
granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. (Abercrombie I),  
No. 08-1470, 2009 WL 3517584 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 26, 2009). 
2 See generally Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004). 
3 See generally Brian Skoloff, Fla. Man Says Home Depot Fired Him Over God Button, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 28, 2009, 9:34 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2009-10-28-
home-depot-god_N.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/R74W-N8S7.  
4 See generally Lorenz v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 05-0319, 2006 WL 1562235 (W.D. Tex. 
May 24, 2006), aff ’d, 225 F. App’x 302 (5th Cir. 2007). 
5 See generally Complaint, Boudlal v. Walt Disney Corp., No. 12-01306 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 
2012), 2012 WL 3267542.  
6 Id. at 3-4. 
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to work in the rear of the café, where she would have no contact with 
customers.7 
There exists an inherent tension in the law—played out daily in  
workplaces across the United States—between an employee’s right to 
religious expression and an employer’s countervailing right to cultivate the 
corporate image of its choosing. Thomas Jefferson famously declared 
religious freedom “the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights.”8 On 
the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has observed: 
“Perhaps no facet of business life is more important than a company’s place 
in public estimation. That the image created by its employees dealing with 
the public . . . affects its relations is so well known that we may take 
judicial notice of an employer’s proper desire to achieve favorable  
acceptance.”9 Although the right to religious expression and the right to 
establish a favorable corporate image are both highly regarded, neither right 
is absolute.  
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires employers to  
accommodate employees whose religious beliefs conflict with some element 
of their job duties, unless doing so would cause “undue hardship on the 
conduct of the employer’s business.”10 In cases where employers claim that a 
religious accommodation would cause undue hardship by damaging their 
corporate image, courts struggle to strike the proper balance between an 
employee’s right to religious expression and an employer’s right to control 
its image. Not only do outcomes vary from court to court, but perhaps more 
disconcertingly, the analysis and reasoning underlying these decisions is 
often inconsistent and, in some cases, contradictory.11 Particularly troublesome 
are the disparate levels of proof courts require for an employer to establish 
that an accommodation would adversely affect its image and therefore 
impose undue hardship. For example, Costco prevailed on summary  
judgment by contending, with little supporting evidence, that it would be 
unduly burdensome to accommodate an employee’s request to leave her 
religiously mandated facial piercings uncovered, because such piercings 
detracted from the “neat, clean and professional image” that the company 
aimed to present.12 By contrast, Abercrombie & Fitch has been on the 
losing end of summary judgment in four cases involving challenges to its 
 
7 Id. at 4. 
8 Thomas Jefferson, Freedom of Religion at the University of Virginia, in THE COMPLETE 
JEFFERSON 957, 958 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943). 
9 Fagan v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115, 1124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(  j) (2012). 
11 See analysis of cases cited infra Part IV. 
12 Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 136-37 (1st Cir. 2004). 
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“Look Policy,” notwithstanding the fashion retailer’s abundant expert and 
lay witness testimony that granting religious-based exemptions would 
interfere with its meticulously crafted image.13 These incongruous results 
have left employers and employees alike wondering when Title VII requires 
a religious accommodation that conflicts with an employer’s corporate 
image and when it does not.  
This Article focuses on the conflict between an employee’s right to  
religious expression and an employer’s right to establish and maintain the 
image of its choosing. I argue that the existing case law provides little 
meaningful guidance for employers and employees facing this conflict. 
Because a company’s image is one of its most valuable assets, courts should 
more closely scrutinize religious accommodation claims that interfere with a 
company’s ability to control its image. I offer three recommendations for 
how courts can recalibrate their analyses of religious accommodation claims 
that do not require any break from Supreme Court precedent and could 
help to produce a clearer, more balanced case law.  
Part I examines America’s changing religious landscape and, more  
specifically, what these changes mean for the workplace. Part II addresses 
the ongoing struggle between Congress, the courts, and the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to reach a consensus on 
the types of religious accommodations required under Title VII. Part III 
explores the power of corporate image and how frontline employees in 
particular can directly influence outsiders’ perceptions of the employer 
through both their appearances and actions. Part IV analyzes the most 
important cases involving claims of image-based undue hardship—
highlighting the need for a more consistent and unified approach to weighing 
religious expression against corporate image. Part V provides recommendations 
for ways courts might analyze corporate image cases in a more uniform, 
practical manner to generate case law that strikes the appropriate balance 
 
13 See generally cases cited supra note 1. In Abercrombie I, the district court denied Abercrombie’s 
summary judgment motion, No. 08-1470, 2009 WL 3517584, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 26, 2009), but 
the jury ultimately decided in favor of the company. Jury Verdict, Abercrombie I, No. 08-1470 (E.D. 
Mo. Dec. 4, 2009), ECF No. 84. In Abercrombie II, the district court granted partial summary 
judgment against Abercrombie, 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1287 (N.D. Okla. 2011), but the appellate 
court reversed on other grounds. 731 F.3d 1106, 1143 (10th Cir. 2013) (ruling that no fact issue 
persisted as to whether Abercrombie knew of the plaintiff ’s religious conflict with its dress code 
prior to its hiring decision, as the plaintiff never informed Abercrombie beforehand that her 
practice of wearing a hijab stemmed from her religious beliefs and that she therefore would require 
an accommodation), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014). In Abercrombie III and Abercrombie IV, the 
district courts granted partial summary judgment against the company. Abercrombie IV, 966 F. 
Supp. 2d. 949, 971 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Abercrombie III, No. 10-3911, 2013 WL 1435290, at *17 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 9, 2013).  
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between religious expression and corporate image and provides employers 
and employees with greater clarity in navigating this sensitive and complex 
issue.  
I. RELIGION AND WORK IN MODERN AMERICA 
The relationship between religion and work in the United States is  
becoming increasingly strained due to two significant developments. First, 
the religious characteristics of the workforce are becoming more complex as 
a result of broader changes in the American religious landscape. Second, 
religious expression in the workplace is becoming more commonplace, as 
traditional barriers between work and religion continue to erode in response 
to a variety of social forces. This Part examines how changes in the religious 
characteristics of the workforce and growing presence of religion at work 
have transformed the American workplace into a tinderbox for religious 
conflict. 
A. America’s Changing Religious Landscape 
The role of religion in the workplace continues to evolve as a result of 
broader shifts in the American religious landscape. Although religion 
remains a prominent fixture of American society, the ways Americans are 
choosing to express—or not express—their religiosity are changing. Particularly 
noteworthy is the decline in formal religious affiliation,14 the increasing 
diversity of religious sects,15 and the growing number of Americans who 
switch religious affiliations.16 These broader social patterns mean religion in 
the workplace looks much different today than just a few years ago. It is 
therefore imperative that employers understand these changes and adapt 
their policies and practices accordingly. 
The most remarkable trend in American religiosity is the rising percentage 
of adults who do not affiliate with any particular religion. While the vast 
majority of Americans—over eighty percent—profess a belief in God,17 the 
number who do not identify with a specific religion continues to grow at a 
rapid pace. One-fifth of the U.S. public and one-third of adults under age 
 
14 PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., “NONES” ON THE 
RISE: ONE-IN-FIVE ADULTS HAVE NO RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION 9 (2012), available at 
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2012/10/NonesOnTheRise-full.pdf.  
15 PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., U.S. RELIGIOUS 
LANDSCAPE SURVEY, RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: DIVERSE AND DYNAMIC 10-12 (2008). 
16 Id. at 5. 
17 TOM W. SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT GOD ACROSS TIME AND COUNTRIES 8 (2012), 
available at http://www.norc.org/PDFs/Beliefs_about_God_Report.pdf.  
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thirty are religiously unaffiliated today—the highest percentages ever in 
Pew Research Center polling.18 Between 2007 and 2012 alone, the percentage 
of unaffiliated adults jumped from just over fifteen percent to approximately 
twenty percent of the U.S. population.19 Significantly, however, nonaffiliation  
does not necessarily equate to nonbelief. Two-thirds of unaffiliated adults 
say they believe in God, more than half report often feeling “a deep connection 
with nature and the earth,” over one-third classify themselves as “‘spiritual’ 
but not ‘religious,’” and one-fifth claim they pray every day.20 For employers, 
this decline in formal religious affiliation necessitates an increased sensitivity 
to both the growing number of nonaffiliated workers and the possibility that 
some employees may still qualify for a religious accommodation despite 
practicing a less formal spirituality. 
A second important trend is the growing diversity of religion in America. 
Although the United States has always been a land of many religions,21 the 
immigrants of the last several decades have dramatically expanded the 
diversity of religious life.22 While Americans remain overwhelmingly 
Christian (78.4%), non-Christian religions continue to grow, with  
Buddhists, Muslims, Baha’is, and others immigrating to the United States in 
greater numbers.23 Moreover, immigration has also increased diversity 
within established religious traditions. For instance, the internal diversity of 
American Judaism is greater than ever before due to the influx of Jewish 
immigrants from Russia and Ukraine.24 The “face of American Christianity has 
also changed” with sizeable Latino, Filipino, and Vietnamese Catholic 
communities; Chinese, Haitian, and Brazilian Pentecostal communities; 
Korean Presbyterians; Indian Mar Thomas; and Egyptian Copts.25 Increasing 
religious diversity presents unique challenges in the workplace, as traditional 
notions of what religion looks like and how it is expressed may no longer be 
accurate. Employers may have to accommodate unfamiliar—and perhaps 
 
18 PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, supra note 14, at 9. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 9-10. 
21 See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 589 (1989) 
(“This Nation is heir to a history and tradition of religious diversity that dates from the settlement 
of the North American Continent.”), abrogated by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 
(2014). 
22 See DIANA L. ECK, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A “CHRISTIAN COUNTRY” 
HAS NOW BECOME THE WORLD’S MOST RELIGIOUSLY DIVERSE NATION 1-4 (2001) 
(discussing the history of Hindus, Buddhists, and Muslims in the United States). 
23 See PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, supra note 15, at 10-11 (finding that while 
78.4% of the American population is Christian, Buddhists constitute 0.7% of the population, Muslims 
constitute 0.6%, and Baha’is and members of other world religions constitute less than 0.3%). 
24 ECK, supra note 22, at 4. 
25 Id. 
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objectionable—religious practices, and employees must learn to work 
together harmoniously despite their religious differences. For employers and 
employees alike, adapting to changes in the American religious landscape 
undoubtedly requires greater familiarization with, and tolerance of, unique 
beliefs and practices.  
A third significant feature of American religiosity is the increasing fluidity 
of religious affiliation. Approximately forty-four percent of American adults 
“have either switched religious affiliation, moved from being unaffiliated 
with any religion to being affiliated with a particular faith, or dropped any 
connection to a specific religious tradition altogether.”26 Although older and 
younger Americans switch religious affiliation at comparable rates,  
affiliation changes tend to be more drastic among younger adults. More 
than half of Americans age seventy and older who changed affiliation 
switched “from one family to another within a religious tradition (e.g., from 
one Protestant denominational family to another),” whereas among adults 
under age thirty, “roughly three-quarters of those who have changed  
affiliation left one religious tradition for another (e.g., left Protestantism for 
Catholicism) or for no religion at all.”27 The remarkable amount of  
movement by Americans from one religious group to another—particularly 
among younger adults—supports the characterization of the United States 
as “a vibrant marketplace where individuals pick and choose religions that 
meet their needs, and religious groups are compelled to compete for 
members.”28 For employers, fluidity of religious affiliation may require 
greater flexibility in accommodating religious beliefs. Employees may need 
different types of accommodations at different points in their employment 
as their religious affiliations change over time.  
B. The Prominence of Religion in the Workplace 
Overt religious expression in the workplace is becoming increasingly 
commonplace. Such expression, however, “has traditionally been frowned 
upon in Corporate America.”29 For years, the prevailing assumption in 
business was that, because we do not all share the same faith-based 
worldview, there must be a wall of separation between work and religion.30 
 
26 PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, supra note 15, at 5. 
27 Id. at 33. 
28 Id. at 22. 
29 Eileen P. Kelly, Accommodating Religious Expression in the Workplace, 20 EMP. RESPS. & 
RTS. J. 45, 46 (2008). 
30 JAMES L. NOLAN, DOING THE RIGHT THING AT WORK: A CATHOLIC’S GUIDE TO 
FAITH, BUSINESS, AND ETHICS 20 (2006). 
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That wall has deteriorated in recent years, as a “spiritual revival”31 in the 
workplace has taken hold, prompting companies like American Airlines to 
establish prayer rooms,32 New York law firms to lead Talmudic studies,33 and 
Tyson Foods to employ a team of chaplains to provide on-site ministerial 
services to employees.34 Today, workplace conversations about religion are 
routine. Twenty-two percent of American workers report sharing their 
religious beliefs with a coworker at least once a month.35 Moreover,  
“religious . . . conversations at work do not seem to generate a great deal 
of discomfort.”36 Seventy-seven percent of workers feel “somewhat” or “very 
comfortable” when the topic of religion arises, whereas just twenty-two 
percent feel “somewhat” or “very uncomfortable.”37 
Scholars attribute the growing prominence of religion in the American 
workplace to a variety of demographic and cultural shifts, as well as to 
transformations within both religion and the workplace. Demographically, 
the most important factor is the aging of the baby boomer generation.38 As 
Americans reach middle age, their interest in faith typically intensifies.39 
Given the tremendous size of the baby boomer cohort, the “characteristic 
 
31 Mark A. Spognardi & Staci L. Ketay, In the Lion’s Den: Religious Accommodation and  
Harassment in the Workplace, 25 EMP. REL. L.J. 7, 7 (2000). 
32 See WFAA Staff, North Texas Employers Answer Prayer Room Requests, WFAA.COM (Oct. 
16, 2009, 10:31 AM), http://www.wfaa.com/news/local/64530747.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
XP5F-BSWW (describing how North Texas companies, including Texas Instruments and 
American Airlines, have made space in their offices to accommodate Muslim employees’ daily 
prayers). 
33 See Michelle Conlin, Religion in the Workplace: The Growing Presence of Spirituality in Corporate 
America, BUS. WK., Nov. 1, 1999, at 151, 152 (“Gone is the old taboo against talking about God at 
work. In its place is a new spirituality, evident in the prayer groups at Deloitte & Touche and the 
Talmud studies at New York law firms such as Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Haroller.”). 
34 See Chaplain Services, TYSON FOODS, INC., http://www.tysonfoodscareers.com/Working-
At-Tyson/Tyson-Benefits/Chaplain-Services.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/GCJ4-AZMV (“Tyson Chaplain Services has chaplains available to Team Members at 
numerous plants around the country and in our corporate offices. The chaplains provides [sic] 
compassionate pastoral care and ministry to Team Members and their families, regardless of their 
religious or spiritual affiliation or beliefs.”). 
35 TANENBAUM CTR. FOR INTERRELIGIOUS UNDERSTANDING, WHAT AMERICAN 
WORKERS REALLY THINK ABOUT RELIGION: TANENBAUM’S 2013 SURVEY OF AMERICAN 
WORKERS AND RELIGION 16 (2013), available at http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/id/bpen-9b7pks/ 
$File/2013TanenbaumWorkplaceAndReligionSurveyEmail.pdf. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 16-17. 
38 See DOUGLAS A. HICKS, RELIGION AND THE WORKPLACE: PLURALISM,  
SPIRITUALITY, LEADERSHIP 28 (2003) (“The most often cited demographic change contributing 
to an increased interest in spirituality, in the workplace and elsewhere, is that the baby boomer 
generation has reached midlife.”). 
39 See id. (“[Y]oung adults have relatively little interest in religious or spiritual matters, but, 
as they reach middle age, their interest in faith heightens.”). 
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attitudes and behaviors [of this generation] have had a disproportionate 
impact on . . . the workplace.”40 Thus, the baby boomers’ heightened 
interest in religion has reshaped the relationship between religion and the 
workplace across all generations of American workers.41 Other demographic 
factors attributed to the rise of religion in the workplace include immigration 
(and the resulting increase in religious pluralism),42 the growing participation 
of women in the labor market,43 and the affluence of American society.44  
Culturally, employees today are more likely to expect, and even demand, 
the right to individualized expression of their whole selves—including their 
religious identities—in the workplace.45 Some employees are no longer 
content to check their religion at the workplace door, believing instead that 
their religious identity, like their race and sex, is an integral part of their 
being that cannot—and should not—be separated from their total person. 
Other “[c]ultural factors such as the stress and pace of modern life, the 
dehumanizing aspects of technology, and the lack of boundaries between 
work and personal time” may also “lead many employees to seek to integrate 
their work life with their religious beliefs.”46 Additionally, Robert Putnam 
argues that the intermingling of work and religion may be part of employees’ 
 
40 Id. 
41 See id. (“[T]he aging of the boomer-dominated workforce has been a prime factor in the 
rise in spirituality in the office.”). 
42 See id. at 30-31 (explaining how immigrants have shared their religions within American 
culture, increasing the breadth and depth of spiritual philosophies used to shape American 
religious culture). 
43 See id. at 41-42 (explaining that women’s increasing participation in the labor force has led 
to the further integration of religion and work because women are more likely than men to discuss 
their faith in the workplace). 
44 See Len Tischler, The Growing Interest in Spirituality in Business: A Long-Term Socio-
Economic Explanation, 12 J. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE MGMT. 273, 276-77 (1999) (explaining 
that economic prosperity enables individuals to focus less on meeting basic human needs and more 
on their own spiritual needs).  
45 See Kelly, supra note 29, at 46-47 (“Individualized expression of the whole person in terms 
of their ethnic, cultural, sexual and other identities is increasingly expected and even demanded by 
employees. Religion is no exception to this trend.” (citation omitted)). 
46 Id. at 47 (citation omitted); see also HICKS, supra note 38, at 46 (“Many employees and 
employers have increasingly brought spirituality to the workplace because they do not have time to 
spend in religious communities.”); Debbie N. Kaminer, When Religious Expression Creates a Hostile 
Work Environment: The Challenge of Balancing Competing Fundamental Rights, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 81, 82-83 (2000–2001) (“Another explanation is the fact that Americans now spend 
more time in the workplace, working in excess of one month more per year than they did a decade 
ago. Therefore, aspects of an individual’s life previously kept private—such as religious belief and 
expression—are more likely to become part of an individual’s work day.”). 
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quest for community as other types of civic associations have diminished in 
quality and importance.47  
Two developments in American religion itself may also be contributing 
to the rise of religion in the workplace. A new public evangelicalism has 
emerged in response to a perceived erosion of Christian morality.48 Galvanized 
to reclaim a prominent voice, evangelicals in particular often use the 
workplace as a staging ground for this expression.49 Additionally, New Age 
religions continue to grow in popularity through their emphasis on “self-
discovery, integration, and harmony.”50 The “noninstitutional or quasi-
institutional nature of New Age [religious] practice has made it conducive 
to expression at the office,”51 as adherents tend to emphasize individual 
expressions of faith through personal spirituality, rather than the rituals of 
organized religion.52 
The workplace, too, has undergone a critical paradigm shift that has  
enabled religion to play a more prominent role in work life. The rational 
and mechanistic view of labor that once dominated has given way to the 
increasing recognition that workers are motivated by more than “self-
interest and competition with other workers.”53 Employers today are more 
likely to view employees in terms of their “whole person,” incapable of 
separating who they are as workers from who they are in total.54 Because an 
employee’s “functioning in the workplace is not isolated from his or her 
functioning as a total person,” “the identity and background of the  
worker . . . influence[s] [his or her] . . . contribution to a production 
process.”55 For many employees, increased spirituality in the workplace 
improves both motivation and morale, which in turn leads to greater 
involvement, satisfaction, and productivity.56 
 
47 See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 111-13 (2000) (surveying Americans’ increasing disconnect from family, 
friends, neighbors, and democratic structures). 
48 See HICKS, supra note 38, at 33-36 (describing the roots, evolution, and motivation  
galvanizing Christian evangelism in public life, specifically combating the rise of American 
secularism). 
49 Id. at 35. 
50 Id. at 31. 
51 Id. at 32. 
52 Id. 
53 See id. at 39-41 (describing the managerial trend toward “person-centered management,” in 
which employees’ role in the workplace is recognized as one part of their lives “not isolated from 
[their] functioning as a total person” (citations omitted)). 
54 Id. at 40. 
55 Id. 
56 See Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor, Workplace Spirituality and Organizational Performance, 63 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 355, 361-62 (2003) (concluding that spirituality in the workplace allows 
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C. The Conflict Between Work and Religion 
Changes in the religious characteristics of the workforce and the growing 
prominence of religion in the workplace have proven to be an explosive 
combination. More than one-third of U.S. workers report experiencing or 
witnessing religious bias at work.57 Employers now face more pressure than 
ever to balance the respective interests of employees, coworkers, and other 
stakeholders.58 This growing struggle is evident from the EEOC’s most 
recent statistics on religious discrimination charges. Between 1997 and 2013, 
the number of religious discrimination charges filed nationally more than 
doubled from 1709 to 3721.59 Within this same timeframe, the percentage of 
charges alleging religious discrimination jumped from 2.1% in 1997 to 4.0% 
in 2013.60 There is also some evidence that religious discrimination charges 
may be increasing in merit, at least from the EEOC’s perspective. The 
EEOC issued reasonable-cause determinations on 4.4% of religious discrim-
ination charges in 1997.61 In 2012, however, that figure rose to 7.1%, before 
dropping to 4.3% in 2013.62 Although religious discrimination charges 
comprise a relatively modest percentage of all discrimination charges, the 
number, percentage, and merits of such charges continue to increase.  
Religious conflict in the workplace has received attention from federal, 
state, and local lawmakers. Legislators have considered a variety of reforms 
attempting to more sharply define the parameters of religious accommodation 
law. Efforts at the federal level have largely failed. While every Congress 
 
businesses to meet their profit-making goals by helping employees feel happier, more creative, and 
more connected to the work community); Fahri Karakas, Spirituality and Performance in Organizations: 
A Literature Review, 94 J. BUS. ETHICS 89, 94-97 (2010) (“[T]here is growing evidence in 
spirituality research that workplace spirituality programs result in positive individual level 
outcomes for employees such as increased joy, serenity, job satisfaction, and commitment. There is 
also evidence that these programs improve organizational productivity and reduce absenteeism and 
turnover.” (citations omitted)). 
57 TANENBAUM CTR. FOR INTERRELIGIOUS UNDERSTANDING, supra note 35, at 20. 
58 See Ronald J. Adams, Balancing Employee Religious Freedom in the Workplace with Customer 
Rights to a Religion-Free Retail Environment, 117 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 281, 281 (2012) (noting the 
polarizing effects of religion in the workplace and the competing interests involved in retail 
environments). 
59  Office of Research, Info. & Planning, Religion-Based Charges: FY 1997 - FY 2013, U.S. 
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ 
religion.cfm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Religion-Based Charges], archived at http:// 
perma.cc/P2EW-3D87. 
60  Office of Research, Info. & Planning, Charge Statistics: FY 1997 Through FY 2013, U.S. 
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ 
charges.cfm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Charge Statistics], archived at http://perma.cc/ 
9879-YKC7. 
61 Religion-Based Charges, supra note 59. 
62 Id. 
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has considered the Workplace Religious Freedom Act (WRFA) since the 
bill’s introduction in 1994,63 it has never come particularly close to passing 
the legislation, despite bipartisan support.64 Although the WRFA has 
undergone various modifications over the years, its primary objective has 
been to provide greater religious freedom to employees by making it more 
difficult for employers to prove that a religious accommodation would cause 
undue hardship.65 The most recent version of the bill, introduced by former 
Senator John Kerry in late 2012,66 died in committee.67 State and municipal 
efforts have proven more successful, with California,68 Oregon,69 and New 
York City70 recently enacting laws similar to the WRFA. As religious 
conflict in the workplace continues to increase in the coming years, the 
legislative response will only intensify.  
II. THE PARAMETERS OF RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION LAW 
In the five decades since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
Congress, the courts, and the EEOC have struggled to reach consensus on 
the extent to which an employer must accommodate an employee’s religious 
expression. Title VII prohibits employers from not hiring, discharging, or 
otherwise “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”71 Title VII also 
 
63 See S. 3686, 112th Cong. (2012); S. 4046, 111th Cong. (2010); S. 3628, 110th Cong. (2008); 
H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1445, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 677, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 893, 
108th Cong. (2003); S. 2572, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 4237, 106th Cong. (2000); S. 1668, 106th 
Cong. (1999); H.R. 2948, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 1124, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 92, 105th Cong. 
(1997); H.R. 4117, 104th Cong. (1996); S. 2071, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 5233, 103d Cong. (1994). 
64 See, for example, H.R. 1431, 110th Cong. (2007), which was introduced by an equal number 
of Republican and Democratic Representatives. See generally LORRAINE C. MILLER, CLERK OF 
THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OFFICIAL LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR PLACES OF RESIDENCE (2009), 
available at http://clerk.house.gov/110/olm110.pdf (showing the party affiliation of every member of 
the House of Representatives of the 110th Congress). 
65 See Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2013, S. 3686, 112th Cong. § 4(a)(3) (defining 
undue hardship as “a significant difficulty or expense on the conduct of the employer’s business”). 
66 Id. at 1.  
67 See S. 3686 (112th): Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2013, GOVTRACK, https:// 
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s3686#overview (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8VZ4-VFMV (stating that the bill was referred to the House Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions in late 2012, and there have been no subsequent votes). 
68 CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12926, 12940 (2013). 
69 OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.033 (2011). 
70 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-102, 8-107 (2010 & Supp. 2012). 
71 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). Additionally, state laws prohibiting religious discrimination 
in employment largely track the language of Title VII, though several contain important differences. 
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forbids employers from “limit[ing], segregat[ing], or classify[ing]” applicants 
or employees “in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee” because of any of the aforementioned characteristics.72 
Little is known about why Congress included religion in Title VII, as the 
legislative history is brief and unilluminating.73 Some scholars contend that 
the arguably voluntary nature of religion makes its inclusion in Title VII 
alongside otherwise immutable characteristics anomalous.74 While the 
propriety of including religion as a protected category is beyond the scope 
of this Article, there can be no doubt that its inclusion in Title VII places 
religion on equal footing with race, color, sex, and national origin. 
Title VII originally provided for equal treatment in employment solely 
by prohibiting status-based discrimination.75 However, soon after Title VII’s 
enactment, the EEOC began receiving complaints from employees whose 
employers refused to grant them time off during the workweek to observe 
their Sabbath or religious holidays.76 This prompted the EEOC to adopt 
new guidelines in 1966, which suggested that it was not enough for an 
employer to treat a religiously observant employee merely the same as other 
employees.77 Instead—and unlike with any of Title VII’s other protected 
classes78—the employer bore an affirmative obligation to accommodate an 
employee’s “reasonable religious needs” unless doing so would create a 
“serious inconvenience to the conduct of the business.”79 A year later, in 
1967, the EEOC retreated slightly from its previous position, revising its 
guidelines to require an employer to provide “reasonable accommodations 
 
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.033(4) (2011) (exempting an employer from providing a 
religious accommodation only “if the accommodation requires significant difficulty or expense”). 
72 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012). 
73 See James A. Sonne, The Perils of Universal Accommodation: The Workplace Religious Freedom 
Act of 2003 and the Affirmative Action of 147,096,000 Souls, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1023, 1034 
(2004) (“[T]here is little in the way of legislative history to determine whether Congress 
considered religion an immutable characteristic, whether it was singled out for protection based on 
its historical importance in the constitutional context, or for some other reason.”). 
74 Id. 
75 Rachel M. Birnbach, Love Thy Neighbor: Should Religious Accommodations that Negatively 
Affect Coworkers’ Shift Preferences Constitute an Undue Hardship on the Employer under Title VII?, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1331, 1336 (2009). 
76 Thomas D. Brierton, “Reasonable Accommodation” Under Title VII: Is It Reasonable to the 
Religious Employee?, 42 CATH. LAW. 165, 167 (2002). 
77 Id. at 167-68. 
78 See Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation 
Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 320 (1997) (observing that whereas Title VII 
generally requires employers to apply workplace requirements “neutrally,” the statute mandates 
“facially different treatment of religion”). 
79 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(2) (1967). 
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to the religious needs of employees and prospective employees where such 
accommodations c[ould] be made without undue hardship on the conduct of 
the employer’s business.”80 The EEOC did not elaborate on what it believed 
made an accommodation “reasonable” or a hardship “undue.” 
The EEOC’s guidelines carried little weight with courts, which were 
leery of interpreting Title VII as imposing affirmative obligations on 
employers. In Dewey v. Reynolds Metals, the Sixth Circuit rejected the 
EEOC’s position outright:  
 Nowhere in the legislative history of the Act do we find any Congressional 
intent to coerce or compel one person to accede to or accommodate the 
religious beliefs of another. The requirement of accommodation to religious 
beliefs is contained only in the EEOC Regulations, which in our judgment 
are not consistent with the Act.  
. . . . 
To construe the Act as authorizing the adoption of Regulations which 
would coerce or compel an employer to accede to or accommodate the  
religious beliefs of all of his employees would raise grave constitutional 
questions of violation of the Establishment Clause of the First  
Amendment. . . .  
The employer ought not to be forced to accommodate each of the varying 
religious beliefs and practices of his employees.81 
After the Supreme Court affirmed the Dewey decision by an equally  
divided Court,82 Congress, led by Senator Jennings Randolph of West 
Virginia,83 responded by amending Title VII in 1972 to broaden the  
definition of “religion” to include “all aspects” of religious observance and to 
impose an affirmative obligation on employers to accommodate an employee’s 
religious observance “unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to 
reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s 
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of 
the employer’s business.”84 The amendment left open the question of what 
constitutes “reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” under the 
law. Some commentators claim Congress’s intent in amending Title VII was 
to ensure employees would not have to choose between their jobs and their 
 
80 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1968). 
81 Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 334-35 (6th Cir. 1970), aff ’d per curiam by an 
equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). 
82 Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689, 689 (1971). 
83 Sonne, supra note 73, at 1039.  
84 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(  j) (2012). 
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religions.85 This seems an overstatement, however, as the qualifiers “reasonable” 
and “undue” indicate Congress anticipated situations would arise where an 
employer may justifiably withhold an accommodation. While Senator 
Randolph did express “deep concern over employees being forced to choose 
between religion and their jobs” and his hope “to eliminate that difficult 
choice for employees,”86 the conditional language of the amendment makes 
clear that some employees may very well have to choose between their jobs 
and their religions if the requisite accommodation would cause the employer 
undue hardship. 
Since the 1972 amendment, courts have struggled to draw clear lines  
between reasonable accommodations and those that cause undue hardship. 
The Supreme Court eliminated some of the confusion in 1977 with its 
seminal decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison.87 In Hardison, the 
Supreme Court confronted for the first time the extent of an employer’s 
obligation to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious expression.88 
The plaintiff worked for Trans World Airlines (TWA) as a supply clerk in a 
department that “operate[d] 24 hours per day, 365 days per year.”89 During 
his employment with TWA, the plaintiff joined the Worldwide Church of 
God, which prohibits adherents from working on certain religious holidays 
and from sunset on Friday until sunset on Saturday in observance of the 
Sabbath.90 TWA held several meetings with the plaintiff to discuss possible 
accommodations.91 TWA was able to accommodate the plaintiff ’s  
observance of religious holidays.92 However, TWA could not exempt the 
plaintiff from Saturday work, because employees at the plaintiff ’s base were 
unionized and the union was unwilling to deviate from the collective 
bargaining agreement’s seniority-based shift-bidding system.93 Seemingly 
 
85 See, e.g., Dawinder S. Sidhu, Out of Sight, Out of Legal Recourse: Interpreting and Revising 
Title VII to Prohibit Workplace Segregation Based on Religion, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
103, 124-26 (2012) (arguing that Senator Randolph’s comments suggest that “Congress did not 
intend to allow employers to segregate minority employees”); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 87 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[A] society that truly values religious 
pluralism cannot compel adherents of minority religions to make the cruel choice of surrendering 
their religion or their job.”). 
86 See Bilal Zaheer, Accommodating Minority Religions Under Title VII: How Muslims Make the 
Case for a New Interpretation of Section 701( j), 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 518; see also 118 CONG. 
REC. 705 (1972).  
87 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
88 Id. at 66.  
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 67. 
91 Id. at 77. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 67, 78. 
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out of options, TWA discharged the plaintiff for insubordination, after he 
stopped reporting for assigned Saturday shifts.94 The plaintiff subsequently 
brought suit against TWA, alleging that the company failed to reasonably 
accommodate his religious beliefs.95 
The district court sided with TWA, concluding that the company satisfied 
its accommodation obligation and that any further accommodation would 
have imposed undue hardship.96 The Eighth Circuit disagreed, determining 
that TWA did not make reasonable efforts to accommodate the plaintiff 
because the company rejected three reasonable alternatives that would not 
have caused undue hardship.97 These alternatives included permitting the 
plaintiff to work a four-day week by using in his place a supervisor or 
coworker on duty elsewhere;98 paying overtime to other available personnel 
to fill the plaintiff ’s Saturday shifts;99 and arranging a swap in shifts  
between the plaintiff and another employee, regardless of the collective 
bargaining agreement’s seniority provisions.100  
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, holding that “TWA 
made reasonable efforts to accommodate [the plaintiff ] and that each of the 
Court of Appeals’ suggested alternatives would have been an undue  
hardship.”101 The Supreme Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s contention 
that the plaintiff ’s religious beliefs took precedence over the seniority 
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, noting “TWA was not 
required by Title VII to carve out a special exception to its seniority system 
in order to help the plaintiff to meet his religious obligations.”102 The Court 
likewise dismissed the other two alternatives that the Eighth Circuit 
considered reasonable, concluding that allowing the plaintiff to work a  
four-day week or paying other employees overtime wages to replace the 
plaintiff on his Saturday shifts “would involve costs to TWA, either in the 
form of lost efficiency in other jobs or higher wages.”103 Such costs, the Court 
 
94 Id. at 69. 
95 Id. 
96 Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 877, 890-91 (W.D. Mo. 1974), rev’d in 
part 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), rev’d 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
97 Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 39-42 (8th Cir. 1975). 
98 Id. at 39-40.  
99 Id. at 40. 
100 Id. at 41.  
101 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 77 (1977). 
102 Id. at 83. 
103 Id. at 84. According to the dissent, however, accommodating the plaintiff by paying  
overtime wages to substitute workers would have cost TWA a total of $150, because the plaintiff 
would have been eligible after three months to transfer to his old department, where he would not 
have to work Saturdays. Id. at 92 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
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determined, could not be imposed on TWA because “requir[ing] TWA to 
bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give [the plaintiff ] Saturdays off 
is an undue hardship.”104 Over Justices Marshall and Brennan’s vigorous 
dissent,105 the Supreme Court set the bar as low as possible for employers to 
withhold a religious accommodation: any accommodation that would cause an 
employer to incur more than de minimis costs constitutes an undue  
hardship and is therefore unreasonable under Title VII.106  
As with Dewey, the Hardison decision prompted efforts by Congress to 
amend Title VII to change “undue hardship” to “severe material hardship.”107 
When those attempts failed, the EEOC issued new guidelines in 1980 that, 
unsurprisingly, interpreted the undue hardship standard more stringently 
than the Hardison court had allowed.108 These new guidelines were notable 
in three regards. First, they stated that an employer could not claim undue 
hardship based on the “mere assumption” that other employees would 
demand accommodation if the employer were to accommodate one  
employee.109 Second, because Title VII contains no set definition of “undue 
hardship” or “reasonable accommodation,” and “de minimis cost” was likewise 
undefined, the guidelines stated that the determination of whether an 
employer had met its burden to accommodate depended on various factors, 
such as the size of the employer, the number of employees needing accom-
modation, and the employer’s operating costs.110 Third, the guidelines 
expanded the definition of “religious practices” to include sincerely held 
 
104 Id. at 84. 
105 In his scathing dissent, Justice Marshall characterized the majority decision as “a fatal 
blow to all efforts under Title VII to accommodate work requirements to religious practices.” Id. at 
86 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that an accommodation, by definition, 
requires unequal treatment by allocating privilege according to religious belief. Id. at 87. He 
contended that by exempting an employer from offering an accommodation that involves more 
than de minimis cost, an employer “need not grant even the most minor special privilege to 
religious observers to enable them to follow their faith.” Id. Justice Marshall concluded: “The 
ultimate tragedy is that despite Congress’ best efforts, one of this Nation’s pillars of strength—our 
hospitality to religious diversity—has been seriously eroded. All Americans will be a little poorer 
until today’s decision is erased.” Id. at 97. 
106 Id. at 84; see also Kaminer, supra note 46, at 100 (“The Supreme Court’s failure to require 
greater accommodation of religious expression in the workplace is not surprising, since courts 
generally tend to focus on Title VII as an anti-discrimination statute and hesitate to require 
differential or preferential treatment based on any of the protected categories.”). 
107 See Robert A. Caplen, Note, A Struggle of Biblical Proportions: The Campaign to Enact the 
Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2003, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 592 (2005) (noting 
various attempts by Congress to “reverse the Court’s definition of undue hardship”). 
108 See id. at 594-96 (stating that the EEOC’s new 1980 guidelines were “an attempt to limit 
the scope of Hardison”).  
109 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(1) (1981). 
110 Id. § 1605.2(e)(1). 
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moral and ethical beliefs.111 These provisions remain part of the EEOC’s 
current guidelines.112 
The Supreme Court has revisited the issue of religious accommodation 
in the workplace just one other time.113 In the 1986 case Ansonia Board of 
Education v. Philbrook, the Court considered whether an employer must 
accept an employee’s preferred accommodation absent proof of undue 
hardship.114 The plaintiff ’s religious beliefs required him to miss approximately 
six days of work each year to observe certain holy days.115 Under the school 
board’s collective bargaining agreement, the employee, a teacher, received 
three days each school year for observance of religious holidays.116 Although 
teachers could use three days of their accumulated sick leave for “necessary 
personal business,” they could not use their sick leave for further religious 
observance.117 Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, the employee 
used the three days granted for religious holidays each year, and then either 
took unpaid leave, scheduled required hospital visits on church holy days, or 
worked on holy days.118 The employee petitioned the school board to adopt 
a policy allowing use of the three days of personal business leave for  
religious observance or, alternatively, to allow him to pay the cost of a 
substitute and receive full pay for additional days off for religious  
observance.119 When the school board rejected both proposals as unreasonable, 
the employee filed suit.120 
The district court ruled against the plaintiff–employee, concluding the 
school board had not placed him “in a position of violating his religion or losing 
his job.”121 The Second Circuit reversed and remanded for consideration of the 
hardship that would result from the employee’s suggested accommodations.122 
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari, in part to address whether “an 
employer must accept the employee’s preferred accommodation absent 
proof of undue hardship.”123 Once again, the Supreme Court construed Title 
 
111  Id. § 1605.1. 
112 29 C.F.R. §§ 1605.1, 1605.2(c)(1), 1605.2(e)(1) (2013). 
113 See Caplen, supra note 107, at 595 (stating that Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 
U.S. 60 (1986), was the “second and most recent Title VII religious accommodation case”).  
114 479 U.S. 60, 63 (1986). 
115 Id. at 62-63. 
116 Id. at 63-64. 
117 Id. at 64. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 64-65. 
120 Id. at 65. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 65-66. 
123 Id. 
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VII’s reasonable accommodation provision narrowly, holding that “an 
employer has met its obligation . . . when it demonstrates that it has 
offered a reasonable accommodation to the employee.”124 Thus, when 
multiple reasonable accommodations are available, an employer need not 
offer the accommodation preferred by the employee.125 Instead, the employer 
can implement the accommodation of its choosing so long as the  
accommodation eliminates the employee’s work–religion conflict.126  
Although the Supreme Court ultimately remanded to the district court to 
determine whether the school board had interpreted its leave policy in a 
nondiscriminatory manner, it observed that the board’s policy requiring the 
plaintiff to take unpaid leave for religious observance exceeding the amount 
of leave days allowed under his collective bargaining agreement “would 
generally be a reasonable one,” even though it was not the employee’s 
preferred accommodation.127  
Hardison and Philbrook helped to solidify the framework for analyzing 
religious accommodations, but the line between a reasonable accommodation 
and an undue hardship remains blurred. To prevail on an accommodation 
claim, a plaintiff-employee must first establish a prima facie case of discrim-
ination by proving that he (1) had a bona fide religious belief that conflicts 
with the employer’s policies or rules, (2) informed his employer of this 
belief, and (3) suffered an adverse employment action for failing to comply 
with the policy or rule.128 The burden then shifts to the employer to show 
that it either offered the employee a reasonable accommodation or that it 
could not have accommodated the employee without undue hardship.129 
Although this framework is fairly straightforward, considerable uncertainty 
persists as to whether a particular accommodation is reasonable or imposes 
an undue hardship. The difficulty of this determination lies in the highly 
fact-specific nature of the inquiry.130 For instance, in some cases, dress code 
 
124 Id. at 69-70 (rejecting the Second Circuit’s approach, because it would give the employee 
“every incentive to hold out for the most beneficial accommodation, despite that an employer 
offers a reasonable resolution to the conflict”). 
125 Id. at 70. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 70-71. 
128 See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013)  
(laying out the framework for analyzing religious accommodation cases), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 
(2014); Antoine v. First Student, Inc., 713 F.3d 824, 831 (5th Cir. 2013) (same); Walden v. Ctrs. for 
Disease Control & Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277, 1293 (11th Cir. 2012) (same). 
129 See sources cited supra note 128. 
130 See, e.g., Sturgill v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 512 F.3d 1024, 1030 (8th Cir. 2008) (“What is 
reasonable depends on the totality of the circumstances and therefore might, or might not, require 
elimination of a particular, fact-specific conflict.”); Hudson v. W. Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 261, 266 
(9th Cir. 1988) (examining the accommodations made available to the employee by the employer 
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exceptions,131 unpaid leave,132 shift swaps,133 and abstention from work 
activities134 constitute reasonable accommodations, whereas in other cases, 
such accommodations have been deemed unduly burdensome—
demonstrating that the line between trivial and nontrivial costs is hardly 
clear. Courts have repeatedly reached opposite conclusions as to whether 
costs, such as coworker burdens,135 economic losses,136 and safety risks,137 rise 
above the de minimis threshold. Without clearly defined parameters, courts 
 
and concluding that “[a]ll of these accommodations together” provided the employee with a 
reasonable accommodation). 
131 Compare EEOC v. GEO Grp., Inc., 616 F.3d 265, 274 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that it was 
unreasonable to require a prison to exempt Muslim female guards from its no-headscarf policy), 
with Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, 58 F.3d 1337, 1341-42 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that an employer 
reasonably accommodated its employee by allowing the employee to wear an antiabortion button, 
even though the employer required the employee to cover up the button while at work). 
132 Compare EEOC v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co., 515 F.3d 307, 319 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that an employer acted reasonably when refusing to grant an eleven-day unpaid leave of 
absence for a religious holiday), with Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 455-56 
(7th Cir. 2013) (finding an issue of fact as to whether allowing an employee to take three weeks of 
unpaid leave would create undue hardship for his employer). 
133 Compare Eversley v. MBank Dall., 843 F.2d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding it unreasonable 
for an employer to force employees, over their express refusal, to permanently switch shifts in 
order to accommodate another employee’s Sabbath observation), with Sanchez-Rodriguez v. 
AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc., 673 F.3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that a voluntary shift swap 
constituted a reasonable accommodation). 
134 Compare Al-Jabery v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 06-3157, 2007 WL 3124628, at *6-7 (D. 
Neb. Oct. 24, 2007) (holding it unreasonable to require a ham processing plant to exempt a 
Muslim employee from cleaning machinery that processed pork), with EEOC v. Work Connection, 
No. 08-5137, 2008 WL 8954713, at *1-5 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2008) (holding that an employment 
agency reasonably accommodated its employees by entering into a consent decree agreeing to no 
longer require job applicants at meatpacking plants to sign forms stating that they would agree to 
handle pork). 
135 Compare Crider v. Univ. of Tenn., Knoxville, 492 F. App’x 609, 614 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding 
coworker dissatisfaction and inconvenience alone insufficient to create an undue hardship), with 
Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The mere possibility of an 
adverse impact on co-workers as a result of [changing schedules] is sufficient to constitute an 
undue hardship.”). 
136 Compare Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1246 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding 
that an accommodation imposing minimal administrative costs did not amount to undue 
hardship), with DePriest v. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 86-5920, 1987 WL 44454, at *3 (6th Cir. 
Oct. 1, 1987) (unpublished table decision) (stating that payment of overtime to one employee so 
another could take time off for religious observance would have imposed an undue hardship on 
employer). 
137 Compare EEOC v. Papin Enters., Inc., No. 07-1549, 2009 WL 961108, at *6-7 (M.D. Fla. 
Apr. 7, 2009) (rejecting an employer’s claim that accommodating an employee’s religiously 
significant nose ring imposed an undue hardship because such facial jewelry could jeopardize food 
safety), with EEOC v. Oak-Rite Mfg. Corp., No. 99-1962, 2001 WL 1168156, at *12-13 (S.D. Ind. 
Aug. 27, 2001) (upholding a manufacturer’s policy requiring all employees to wear long pants 
because exploring alternative accommodations, such as allowing female employees to wear close-
fitting, ankle-length skirts, would put employee safety at risk, thereby posing an undue hardship). 
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seem to pick and choose which facts to emphasize to support the preferred 
outcome. Consequently, both employers and employees have little judicial 
guidance as to when Title VII requires a religious accommodation.  
As religious conflicts in the workplace continue to rise, some lawmakers 
have recognized the need to clarify when employees are entitled to religious 
accommodation under Title VII. The latest incarnation of the WRFA, for 
example, would have imposed accommodation standards similar to those of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).138 The WRFA would 
have required employers to engage in an interactive process with employees 
requesting religious accommodations and redefined “undue hardship” to 
mean “a significant difficulty or expense on the conduct of the employer’s 
business when considered in light of relevant factors set forth in section 
101(10)(B) of the [ADA].”139 While the merits of such legislation are certainly 
debatable, Congress’s efforts to address a problem that the courts seem 
unable or unwilling to resolve are noteworthy.  
In sum, there is no question that religion warrants the same protection 
under Title VII as race, color, sex, and national origin in terms of status-
based discrimination. But unlike the other protected categories, Title VII 
imposes an affirmative duty on employers to accommodate religion under 
certain circumstances. The extent of this obligation has been the source of 
much disagreement for five decades, as Congress, the courts, and the EEOC 
have struggled to align their interpretations of the law. The fact-specific 
nature of religious accommodation claims has generated an uneven, and at 
times contradictory, body of case law that often raises more questions than 
it answers. Attempts to clarify the parameters of religious accommodation 
law have largely failed, particularly on the federal level, suggesting that at 
least some legislators are content with the status quo.140 
 
138 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2014)). 
139 Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2013, S. 3686, 112th Cong. § 4(a)(2)-(3) (2012). 
Under section 101(10)(B) of the ADA, factors to consider in determining whether an accommodation 
would impose an undue hardship include: (1) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed; 
(2) the overall financial resources of the facility involved in the provision of the accommodation, 
the number of persons employed at such facility, and the effect on expenses and resources of such 
accommodation upon the operation of the facility; (3) the overall financial resources of the 
employer and the size of the business with respect to the number of its employees and the number, 
type, and location of its facilities; and (4) the nature of the employer’s operations. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(10)(B) (2012).  
140 See Sonne, supra note 73, at 1045 (“[T]he fact that no [proposed version of the WRFA] 
ha[s] yet passed reflects, at the very least, some congressional support for the Court’s approach.”). 
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III. THE POWER OF CORPORATE IMAGE 
Few assets are as critical to an organization’s success as the image it  
projects to customers, shareholders, the media, and the general public. 
Image and the related concepts of branding, identity, and reputation draw 
academic interest from diverse fields, including economics, management, 
marketing, organizational behavior, sociology, and visual or graphic design.141 
Interdisciplinary research has generated a myriad of definitions, dimensions, 
and measurements of corporate image. Generally speaking, corporate image 
refers to the “net result of all experiences, impressions, beliefs, feelings, and 
knowledge people have about a company.”142 Corporate image consists of 
both “functional and emotional” components, the former relating to “tangible 
attributes that can easily be measured,” whereas the latter is associated with 
more nuanced “psychological dimensions that are manifested by feelings 
and attitudes towards an organisation.”143 Image derives from an “aggregate 
process by which customers compare and contrast the various attributes of 
[an] organisation[],” such as its name, architecture, products, services, 
traditions, ideologies, and employees.144 Thus, in a very real sense, the 
perception of a corporation is more important than reality—regardless of 
whether a stakeholder’s view accurately reflects the organization’s true 
profile.  
In today’s hypercompetitive business environment in which companies 
often struggle to stand out from the competition, a positive, well-defined 
image can mean the difference between success and failure. The importance 
of corporate image is evident from the vast and varied laws designed to 
protect an organization’s rights to cultivate the image of its choosing. 
Commercial speech, defamation, noncompetition, privacy, trademark, and 
trade secret laws are just some of the legal protections available to a company 
 
141 See Sebastian Arendt & Malte Brettel, Understanding the Influence of Corporate Social  
Responsibility on Corporate Identity, Image, and Firm Performance, 48 MGMT. DECISION 1469, 1471-72 
(2010) (noting that a sizable body of research from the fields of graphic design, organizational 
behavior, and marketing has addressed corporate identity management); Hean Tat Keh & Yi Xie, 
Corporate Reputation and Customer Behavioral Intentions: The Roles of Trust, Identification and 
Commitment, 38 INDUS. MARKETING MGMT. 732, 733 (2009) (describing the vast body of 
academic research in management, economics, sociology, and marketing focused on corporate 
reputation). 
142 Sir Robert Worcester, Reflections on Corporate Reputations, 47 MGMT. DECISION 573, 578 
(2009); see also Nha Nguyen, The Collective Impact of Service Workers and Servicescape on the 
Corporate Image Formation, 25 HOSPITALITY MGMT. 227, 230 (2006) (“Corporate image is the 
consumer’s response to the total offering and is defined as the sum of beliefs, ideas, and  
impressions that a public has of an organisation.” (citation omitted)). 
143 Nguyen, supra note 142, at 231 (citation omitted). 
144 Id. at 230-31. 
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seeking to defend its image. In enforcing these laws, courts are typically 
quick to emphasize the importance of image. As one district court observed, 
“[t]here are few things in our commercial life more valuable than a company’s 
reputation, goodwill, and trademarks.”145  
Corporate image deserves legal protection, as researchers have linked 
corporate image to a myriad of outcomes impacting an organization’s 
bottom line. A favorable image or reputation is positively associated with 
business continuity and growth, organizational morale, and overall strength 
and profitability.146 As such, reputation may be “the most valuable intangible 
asset that helps sustain an organization throughout its lifetime” and  
“safeguard [it] at times of crises.”147  
One of the most critical components of corporate image is the appearance 
and conduct of frontline employees who interact with the company’s various 
stakeholders and thus form the face of the company. Depending on their 
actions, these employees can project a positive or negative image of their 
company to the consuming public. For example, teen-fashion retailer Rue 21 
recently received negative press after a sales clerk allegedly told a fourteen-
year-old customer that she was “too big” for the store’s clothing.148 By 
contrast, fast-food chain Chick-fil-A received worldwide acclaim when one 
of its drive-through workers responded to a verbally abusive customer with 
remarkable poise and kindness.149 For better or worse, the behavior of 
frontline employees plays a key role in stakeholders’ perceptions of the 
company. As the touchpoint of a company, frontline employees are pivotal 
 
145 By-Rite Distrib., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 577 F. Supp. 530, 541 (D. Utah 1983). 
146 See Roderick J. Brodie et al., Investigating the Service Brand: A Customer Value Perspective, 
62 J. BUS. RES. 345, 347-49 (2009) (finding that a positive image and reputation has direct 
influence on customers’ perceptions of service quality and indirect influence on customer loyalty); 
Keh & Xie, supra note 141, at 733 (discussing the beneficial effects of a positive corporate image, 
including better financial performance, the ability to attract larger investments, higher employee 
morale, and better marketing abilities); Hamed M. Shamma, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding 
of Corporate Reputation: Concept, Measurement and Implications, 7 INT’L J. BUS. & MGMT. 151, 161 
(2012) (collecting studies that demonstrate the strategic benefits of nurturing a positive corporate 
reputation).  
147 Shamma, supra note 146, at 151. 
148 Ashley Lutz, Teenager Says She Was Kicked Out of a Clothing Store for Being Too Fat, BUS. 
INSIDER (Sept. 3, 2013, 12:26 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/teen-got-kicked-out-of-rue-
21-for-weight-2013-9, archived at http://perma.cc/9995-3AV7. 
149 See Philip Caulfield, Chick-fil-A Drive-Thru Worker Forgives Bully Who Heckled Her for  
Company’s Anti-Gay Stance in Viral Video, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2012, 12:22 PM), http://www. 
nydailynews.com/news/national/chick-fil-a-drive-thru-worker-forgives-bully-heckled-company-
anti-gay-stance-viral-video-article-1.1131566, archived at http://perma.cc/Y7SR-CBA9 (praising a 
cashier at Chick-fil-A for how she handled an angry customer). 
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in developing customer relationships, gathering customer information, and 
creating customer satisfaction, loyalty, and brand commitment.150  
Given the importance of frontline employees to corporate image, it is no 
wonder that many companies require employees to follow strict dress and 
conduct standards. Controlling how employees look and act serves a 
“variety of organizational objectives” such as projecting a positive and 
consistent company image, fostering adherence to company norms, and 
conveying different levels of status and prestige.151 Employee appearance, in 
particular, is associated with a range of stakeholder impressions and behaviors 
that can directly impact a company’s image. For example, one study found 
that consumers tend to perceive a store with obese salespeople as less 
successful than other stores and come away with a poorer store image.152 
Another study discerned that employee cues such as appearance can  
positively influence consumers’ perceptions of interpersonal service quality.153 
And other researchers found that older consumers perceive tattooed white-
collar workers as less intelligent and less honest than non-tattooed workers.154 
As with physical appearance and demeanor, employees’ manner of dress 
influences corporate image: appropriately dressed personnel can, according 
to one study, lead to higher service-quality expectations and higher consumer 
intention to patronize a service business.155 Moreover, the formality of 
employee clothing can inform consumer inferences about service quality 
and can also influence—directly and indirectly—consumers’ perceptions of 
 
150 See Christoph Burmann & Verena König, Does Internal Brand Management Really Drive 
Brand Commitment in Shared-Service Call Centers?, 18 J. BRAND MGMT. 374, 387-89 (2011) (stating 
that developing brand commitment in shared-service centers is important because customer 
contacts influence the consumer–brand relationship). See generally Eric (Er) Fang et al., Effects of 
Customer and Innovation Asset Configuration Strategies on Firm Performance, 48 J. MARKETING RES. 
587 (2011) (discussing the importance of customer assets and their relationship to the firm’s 
financial situation). 
151 Carrie Leigh Haise & Margaret Rucker, The Flight Attendant Uniform: Effects of Selected 
Variables on Flight Attendant Image, Uniform Preference and Employee Satisfaction, 31 SOC. BEHAV. & 
PERSONALITY 565, 566 (2003). 
152 Michael L. Klassen et al., Perceived Effect of a Salesperson’s Stigmatized Appearance on Store 
Image: An Experimental Study of Students’ Perceptions, 6 INT’L REV. RETAIL, DISTRIBUTION & 
CONSUMER RES. 216, 222 (1996). 
153 Julie Baker et al., The Influence of Multiple Store Environment Cues on Perceived Merchandise 
Value and Patronage Intentions, 66 J. MARKETING 120, 127-28, 137 (2002). 
154 Dwane H. Dean, Consumer Perceptions of Visible Tattoos on Service Personnel, 20 MANAGING 
SERVICE QUALITY 294, 303 (2010). 
155 Chris Y. Shao et al., The Effects of Appropriateness of Service Contact Personnel Dress on Customer 
Expectations of Service Quality and Purchase Intention: The Moderating Influences of Involvement and 
Gender, 57 J. BUS. RES. 1164, 1172 (2004). 
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store image.156 On a contrary note, ill-fitting uniforms can convey that a 
company is careless and inefficient, while well-fitting uniforms give the 
opposite impression.157  
Today, many employers have come to expect their frontline employees to 
do more than merely comply with dress and conduct policies. Recognizing 
the vital role employees can play in projecting corporate image, businesses 
are leveraging employees for brand-building by strategically aligning 
employee behavior and appearance with brand positioning.158 Thus,  
Southwest Airlines seeks fun and vivacious personalities for its flight crews, 
while sportswear retailer Lululemon hires avid runners and yoga instructors as 
sales staff.159 Employees become a part of the brand itself by dressing and 
behaving in a manner consistent with the corporate brand.160 Under the 
rubric of “living the brand,” ordinary frontline employees are transformed 
into brand ambassadors, who communicate the values associated with the 
corporate brand through their behavior and interactions with customers.161 
Reinforcement of brand meaning during customer service interactions leads 
customers to form “positive brand impressions” that accurately reflect the 
“brand’s overall meaning.”162 
Significantly, “living the brand” not only affects customer perceptions 
but may also have the added benefit of influencing how employees think and 
act.163 Because dress contributes to a “sense of self,” controlling appearance 
through dress is potentially an effective way to influence employees’  
behavior.164 Indeed, one study found that store clerks who wear uniforms 
are more likely to follow company rules regarding displaying positive 
emotions than are clerks not in uniform.165 As employees align their personal 
 
156 Ruoh-Nan Yan et al., Does Formality Matter? Effects of Employee Clothing Formality on  
Consumers’ Service Quality Expectations and Store Image Perceptions, 39 INT’L J. RETAIL &  
DISTRIBUTION MGMT. 346, 355-57 (2011). 
157 Kathy Nelson & John Bowen, The Effect of Employee Uniforms on Employee Satisfaction, 41 
CORNELL HOTEL & RESTAURANT ADMIN. Q. 86, 88 (2000). 
158 Nancy J. Sirianni et al., Branded Service Encounters: Strategically Aligning Employee Behavior 
with the Brand Positioning, 77 J. MARKETING 108, 108-09 (2013). 
159 Id. at 108. 
160 See Celia V. Harquail, Employees as Animate Artifacts: Employee Branding by “Wearing the 
Brand” (discussing the rise of “internal branding” through encouraging employees to dress and act 
in a way consistent with the brand), in ARTIFACTS AND ORGANIZATIONS: BEYOND MERE 
SYMBOLISM 161, 163 (Anat Rafaeli & Michael G. Pratt eds., 2006). 
161 Id. at 161-67. 
162 Sirianni et al., supra note 158, at 108-09. 
163 See Harquail, supra note 160, at 166 (finding that employee branding may be useful in 
influencing “the thoughts and behaviors of employees themselves”). 
164 Id.  
165 Anat Rafaeli, When Clerks Meet Customers: A Test of Variables Related to Emotional Expressions 
on the Job, 74 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 385, 389 (1989). 
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image with the corporate brand, they become increasingly conscious of how 
they represent the brand and thus may be more likely to keep the brand and 
its attributes in the forefront of their minds while interacting with customers 
and coworkers.166  
The importance of corporate image is difficult to overstate. Various 
studies have established a strong link between image and a wide range of 
economic indicators, each of which ultimately affects an organization’s 
bottom line.167 As frontline employees play a critical role in how outsiders 
perceive an organization,168 many employers have moved beyond requiring 
employees to simply comply with dress and conduct standards and now 
expect them to live the corporate brand through what they wear and how 
they act.169 Because a favorable corporate image can take years to build and 
mere seconds to destroy, the law must grant organizations freedom to 
cultivate the image of their choosing while safeguarding against unwarranted 
interference with their right to do so. 
IV. KEY CASES WEIGHING RELIGION AGAINST IMAGE 
Since the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Hardison that a religious 
accommodation under Title VII is only reasonable if it does not impose 
more than de minimis costs,170 employers often have the upper hand in 
defending against religious accommodation claims. But while courts  
frequently find undue hardship where profitability or productivity is at 
stake,171 they are more skeptical of undue hardship claims based on  
corporate image concerns.172 Despite abundant research demonstrating the 
importance of image to organizations, the notion of image presents unique 
conceptual and empirical challenges that courts have proven ill-equipped to 
handle. Consequently, as the following cases illustrate, there is little consensus 
 
166 See id. at 391 (discussing the possibility that wearing uniforms may increase awareness of 
one’s emotions). 
167 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
168 See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text. 
169 See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text. 
170 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). 
171 See, e.g., Wilson v. U.S. W. Commc’ns, 58 F.3d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding undue 
hardship where allowing the plaintiff to wear a button depicting a fetus decreased her coworkers’ 
productivity by forty percent); El-Amin v. First Transit, Inc., No. 04-0072, 2005 WL 1118175, at *6 
(S.D. Ohio May 11, 2005) (finding undue hardship where accommodating the plaintiff ’s beard 
would cost employer twenty-five dollars per day under terms of a customer contract). 
172 See, e.g., Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 7, 17 (D. Mass. 2006) (raising 
concerns that employers could rely on corporate image to “tolerate the religious practices of 
predominant groups” while “forbidding practices that are less widespread or well known”). 
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on what constitutes an image-related undue hardship or what evidence is 
sufficient to prove such hardship.  
A. Cases Favoring Image over Religion 
Courts typically sided with employers in the earliest cases pitting religious 
expression against corporate image. Their analyses focused primarily on 
whether there were possible inconsistencies between the proposed  
accommodations and the company’s image, rather than whether such 
inconsistencies generated customer complaints, lost business, or other 
tangible evidence of hardship.  
One of the first cases addressing a claim of image-related undue hardship 
was EEOC v. Sambo’s of Georgia, Inc.173 The EEOC brought suit on behalf a 
practicing Sikh, whose religion prohibited him from shaving his beard, after 
Sambo’s rejected his application for a restaurant manager position pursuant 
to its grooming policy that forbade restaurant personnel from having any 
facial hair other than a neatly trimmed mustache.174 At the bench trial, 
Sambo’s argued that granting an exception to its grooming policy would 
constitute undue hardship because the policy was necessary to protect the 
“clean cut,” sanitary image Sambo’s had built up over the years.175 Sambo’s 
presented no evidence of customer complaints, and instead relied on its 
management’s perceptions and experience to support its claim that a 
“significant segment” of family-restaurant consumers preferred restaurants 
whose employees were clean-shaven, either out of “a simple aversion to, or 
discomfort in dealing with, bearded people; from a concern that beards are 
unsanitary or conducive to unsanitary conditions; or . . . from a concern 
that a restaurant operated by a bearded manager might be lax in maintaining 
its standards as to cleanliness and hygiene in other regards.”176 Sambo’s 
supplemented its testimonial evidence with a National Restaurant Association 
survey showing cleanliness ranked as a “consideration of utmost concern in 
the minds of the consuming public.”177  
The district court easily determined that Sambo’s would suffer undue 
hardship by exempting the plaintiff from its grooming policy.178 The court 
found the exemption “would adversely affect Sambo’s public image and the 
operation of the affected restaurant or restaurants as a consequence of 
 
173 530 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Ga. 1981). 
174 Id. at 88-89. 
175 Id. at 89-90. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 90-91. 
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offending certain customers and diminishing the ‘clean cut’ image of the 
restaurant and its personnel,” thus imposing “a significant cost to Sambo’s 
Restaurants that is more than merely de minimis.”179 In rejecting the 
EEOC’s contention that Sambo’s illegally considered customer preference 
in maintaining its grooming policy, the court noted that even if the policy 
were “nothing more than an appeal to customer preference, . . . it is not 
the law that customer preference is an insufficient justification as a matter of 
law.”180 The court did not stop there, noting that even if Sambo’s had 
discriminated against the plaintiff because of his religion, such discrimination 
was justified because “clean-shavenness is a bona fide occupational qualification 
for a manager of a restaurant, such as those operated by Sambo’s,” that 
markets to families.181 
The deference the Sambo’s court afforded the employer became standard 
in subsequent cases involving image-related hardships. For example, in 
Johnson v. Halls Merchandising, Inc., the court did not cite any evidence of 
undue hardship in awarding the employer summary judgment.182 The 
plaintiff claimed that Halls Merchandising failed to reasonably accommodate 
her religiously mandated need to “preface nearly every sentence she spoke 
with the phrase ‘In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth.’”183 Halls argued it 
could not reasonably accommodate the plaintiff without potentially damaging 
its relationship with customers.184 The district court agreed, concluding 
Halls had “legitimate and reasonable interests” in operating its retail 
business “so as not to offend the religious beliefs or non beliefs of its 
customers.”185 The court did not reference any evidence in the record 
indicating the plaintiff ’s religious expression had or was likely to jeopardize 
customer relationships; instead, it focused on the fact that her religious 
expression was at odds with Halls’s reasonable interest in maintaining a 
nonoffensive environment for customers.186 
In Hussein v. Waldorf-Astoria, a Muslim banquet waiter brought suit 
against one of New York’s most iconic luxury hotels, the Waldorf Astoria, 
for refusing to let him work when he arrived for his shift with a beard in 
 
179 Id. at 90. 
180 Id. at 91. 
181 Id. 
182 No. 87-1042, 1989 WL 23201, at *2-3 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 17, 1989) (accepting the defendant–
employer’s argument of undue hardship based on a lack of genuine issue of material fact concerning 
the plaintiff–employee’s religious beliefs and consequent behavior). 
183 Id. at *2. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
  
2015] Image Is Everything 727 
 
violation of the hotel’s grooming standards.187 Although the plaintiff 
claimed his beard was “part of [his] religion,” hotel management denied his 
request for an exemption from the grooming policy in part because they 
believed it would “jeopardize the hotel’s reputation” as well as “undermin[e] 
its efforts to maintain standards and discipline among the banquet waiters.”188 
The court granted the Waldorf ’s summary judgment motion, holding the 
hotel had “valid, nondiscriminatory reasons” for its no-beard policy and that 
accommodating Hussein’s last-minute request for an exemption was an 
undue hardship as a matter of law.189 The court did not elaborate on what, if 
any, evidence justified this conclusion but simply pointed out that courts in 
Sambo’s and other cases had determined that “clean-shavenness is a bona fide 
occupational qualification in certain businesses and, in those situations, as 
long as the employer’s grooming requirement is not directed at a religion, 
enforcing the policy is not an unlawful discriminatory practice.”190 
Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (IMC), Inc.191 was the first corporate image 
case involving an actual customer complaint. There, the plaintiff sought an 
injunction against her employer, U.S.F. Logistics, so that she could use the 
phrase “Have a Blessed Day” in her written communications with customers 
as an expression of her Christian faith.192 U.S.F. permitted her to use the 
phrase until a representative of its largest customer complained.193 U.S.F. 
subsequently reprimanded Anderson and implemented a new policy 
prohibiting employees from “using ‘additional religious, personal or political 
statements’ in their closing remarks in verbal or written communications” 
with customers or coworkers.194 Despite its changed policy, U.S.F. continued 
to allow the employee to “use the ‘Blessed Day’ phrase with coworkers, to 
hang objects containing various religious phrases in her work area, to read 
the Bible on her work break and to listen to a religiously oriented radio 
station at her work station.”195 The district court denied the plaintiff–
employee’s request for an injunction, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.196 
On appeal, she argued that U.S.F. failed to present the lower court with any 
evidence that she had imposed her religious beliefs on customers through 
 
187 134 F. Supp. 2d 591, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
188 Id. at 598. 
189 Id. at 599. 
190 Id. 
191 274 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2001). 
192 Id. at 474. 
193 Id. at 473. 
194 Id. at 474. 
195 Id. at 477. 
196 Id. at 474, 478. 
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her use of the “Blessed Day” phrase.197 The Seventh Circuit disagreed, 
reasoning that the customer complaint indicated the employee’s religious 
practice could, at the very least, damage U.S.F.’s relationship with its largest 
customer.198 The court concluded that permitting the employee to express 
her religion in various ways within the office was a reasonable accommodation 
but requiring U.S.F. to let her express her religion to customers constituted 
undue hardship.199 
Birdi v. UAL Corp.200 was the first case to address whether an employer 
can transfer a frontline employee whose religious expression conflicts with 
the corporate image to a position that does not involve customer contact. 
The plaintiff–employee, a Sikh, sued United Airlines for removing him 
from his position as a customer service representative based on his need to 
wear a turban for religious purposes.201 United’s uniform policy required 
that “[a]ll headgear must be removed when indoors.”202 United “attempted 
to accommodate [the employee] by offering him six alternative positions in 
which he could wear his [turban].”203 The employee refused, claiming the 
proposed accommodations were unreasonable, primarily because four of the 
positions offered would not have allowed him face-to-face customer contact, 
which was the main reason he took the original position.204 The district 
court disagreed, concluding United fulfilled its accommodation obligation 
by offering the employee multiple alternative positions, one of which 
involved telephone customer contact and two of which paid more than his 
current position.205 The court noted that Title VII did “not require United to 
accommodate [the employee’s] need for face-to-face customer contact”;206 
rather, the company’s efforts in offering multiple positions were sufficient to 
constitute reasonable accommodation.207 This decision was especially 
significant as it opened the door for an employer to remove an employee 
 
197 Id. at 476. 
198 Id. at 476-77. 
199 See id. (finding that U.S.F.’s actions, including permitting the plaintiff to say a prayer 
during a company event, demonstrated that the employer made reasonable accommodations and 
that the plaintiff ’s continued use of the phrase in question after a customer complaint threatened 
the company’s relations with that customer). 
200 88 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 877 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
201 Id. at *1. 
202 Id. (alteration in original).  
203 Id. 
204 Id. at *2. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 See id. at *1-2 (calling United’s actions an attempt to engage in “a conversation . . . during 
which [the employee] could express his preferences” and noting that accommodations are not 
unreasonable simply because such preferences are denied). 
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whose religious expression conflicts with the corporate image, provided that 
the employee is offered a comparable position. 
Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp.208 provides the most in-depth appellate 
analysis of the conflict between corporate image and employee religious 
expression. While working as a cashier at Costco, the plaintiff engaged in 
various forms of body modification, including facial piercing and cutting, 
which she claimed was a tenet of her religious beliefs as a member of the 
Church of Body Modification.209 When Costco later revised its dress code 
to prohibit all facial jewelry other than earrings, the plaintiff refused to 
comply because she believed that her religion required her piercings to be 
visible at all times.210 Eventually, Costco offered to accommodate the 
plaintiff by letting her wear either clear plastic retainers or a Band-Aid over 
her jewelry.211 Despite having herself suggested using retainers or Band-Aid 
coverings as a solution months earlier, the plaintiff rejected this offer, and 
Costco consequently terminated her employment.212 During the court 
proceedings, the plaintiff insisted that the only reasonable accommodation 
was for Costco to excuse her from its dress code.213 Costco, however, 
maintained that such an exemption would create an undue hardship by 
“interfer[ing] with [the company’s] ability to maintain a professional 
appearance.”214 The preface to Costco’s dress code underscores the  
importance of image to the company: “Appearance and perception play a 
key role in member service. Our goal is to be dressed in professional attire 
that is appropriate to our business at all times. . . . All Costco employees 
must practice good grooming and personal hygiene to convey a neat, clean 
and professional image.”215  
The district court granted Costco summary judgment, holding that the 
offer to allow the plaintiff to temporarily cover her piercings or wear 
retainers was “manifestly reasonable.”216 On appeal, the First Circuit did not 
decide whether the accommodation was reasonable but instead affirmed the 
lower court’s decision based on Costco’s undue hardship argument.217 The 
plaintiff argued that Costco’s undue hardship was purely hypothetical 
 
208 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004). 
209 Id. at 129. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 130. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 135 (alteration in original). 
216 Id. at 131. 
217 Id. at 134. 
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because “she did not receive complaints about her facial piercings 
and . . . the piercings did not affect her job performance.”218 While 
acknowledging that courts are “somewhat skeptical of hypothetical hardships” 
in the religious accommodation arena, the court responded that, 
“‘[n]evertheless, it is possible for an employer to prove undue hardship 
without actually having undertaken any of the possible accommodations.’ It 
can do so by ‘examining the specific hardships imposed by specific  
accommodation proposals.’”219 The court then turned to the issue of corporate 
image, declaring: 
It is axiomatic that, for better or for worse, employees reflect on their  
employers. This is particularly true of employees who regularly interact 
with customers, as [the plaintiff ] did in her cashier position. Even if [the 
plaintiff ] did not personally receive any complaints about her appearance, 
her facial jewelry influenced Costco’s public image and, in Costco’s  
calculation, detracted from its professionalism.220 
Without any citation to the record, the court accepted two critical  
assumptions about the plaintiff ’s appearance: it influenced Costco’s public 
image, and it detracted from the company’s professionalism.221 The court 
considered this a “business determination” within Costco’s discretion.222 In 
the court’s estimation, granting an exemption to the plaintiff would constitute 
an undue hardship because it would go against Costco’s determination that 
facial piercings would detract from the “‘neat, clean and professional image’ 
that it aims to cultivate.”223 The court observed that “Costco is far from 
unique in adopting personal appearance standards to promote and protect 
its image,”224 and pointed out that “[c]ourts considering Title VII religious 
discrimination claims have also upheld dress code policies that, like Costco’s, 
are designed to appeal to customer preference or to promote a professional 
public image.”225  
In subsequent cases, employers have frequently relied upon Cloutier in 
arguing that an inconsistency between a religious accommodation and a 
company’s image can, in and of itself, constitute undue hardship. In Brown 
 
218 Id. at 135. 
219 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Draper v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th 
Cir. 1975); Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1490 (10th Cir. 1989)). 
220 Id. at 135. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 136. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 135. 
225 Id. at 136. 
  
2015] Image Is Everything 731 
 
v. F.L. Roberts & Co., the district court granted the employer’s summary 
judgment motion solely on this basis, despite expressing serious concern 
about the potential for abuse.226 In his work as a technician at Jiffy Lube, the 
plaintiff in Brown serviced vehicles in both the upper and lower bays of the 
facility and occasionally greeted customers and discussed products and 
services with them.227 The plaintiff was a practicing Rastafarian, who did not 
shave or cut his hair because of his religious beliefs.228 During the plaintiff ’s 
employment, Jiffy Lube implemented a policy requiring employees with 
customer contact to be clean-shaven, after a consultant presented data to 
management indicating that businesses with a clean-shaven appearance policy 
tended to be more successful.229 Like in Birdi, Jiffy Lube accommodated the 
plaintiff by allowing him to work exclusively in the lower bay, which was out 
of customer view.230 The plaintiff objected, arguing that this accommodation 
was unreasonable because working conditions were significantly worse in 
the isolated lower bay.231  
The court did not decide whether the accommodation was reasonable 
but instead focused on whether exempting the plaintiff from the grooming 
policy would subject Jiffy Lube to undue hardship.232 The court noted that 
under Cloutier, “granting an outright exemption from a neutral dress code 
would be undue hardship because it would adversely affect the employer’s 
public image.”233 The court therefore granted summary judgment to Jiffy 
Lube but expressed a “sense of uneasiness” with the decision that it believed 
Cloutier compelled: 
If Cloutier’s language approving employer prerogatives regarding “public 
image” is read broadly, the implications for persons asserting claims for 
religious discrimination in the workplace may be grave. One has to wonder 
how often an employer will be inclined to cite this expansive language to 
terminate or restrict from customer contact, on image grounds, an employee 
wearing a yarmulke, a veil, or the mark on the forehead that denotes Ash 
Wednesday for many Catholics. More likely, and more ominously,  
considerations of “public image” might persuade an employer to tolerate the 
religious practices of predominant groups, while arguing “undue hardship” 
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and “image” in forbidding practices that are less widespread or well 
known.234 
The court questioned whether Cloutier, Sambo’s, Hussein, and other  
corporate image cases deferring to employer preference could be read to 
rely on narrower grounds, such as an employee’s demand for a complete 
exemption from the company policy, the last-minute timing of the employee’s 
demand, or, in the case of Sambo’s, sanitation concerns.235 The court  
observed that these cases illustrate the difficulty of striking the proper 
balance between employee religious beliefs and employer preferences236 and 
cautioned against tipping the balance too strongly in favor of the employer, 
reasoning that “[a]n excessive protection of an employer’s ‘image’ predilection 
encourages an unfortunately (and unrealistically) homogeneous view of our 
richly varied nation” and forces employees with work–religion conflicts to 
choose between their jobs and their religions.237 
One of the most recent cases favoring corporate image over religious 
expression is Lorenz v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.238 The Lorenz plaintiff, an 
overnight stocker at Wal-Mart, referred to his religious beliefs as “Universal 
Belief System.”239 He expressed his beliefs by showing up for work wearing 
various pieces of religious attire, including a priest’s shirt and collar, a beret 
and a court jester hat, a kaffiyeh (Muslim headdress), a fanny pack with an 
anarchy symbol, a chain with multiple crosses hanging from it, and a 
necklace with a crucifix.240 After a customer complained about the plaintiff ’s 
attire, the store manager discussed with him the importance of customer 
perception and respect for others.241 The manager allowed the plaintiff to 
continue wearing the kaffiyeh but prohibited the rest of his attire.242 The 
manager subsequently learned of other customer and coworker complaints, 
which led him to conclude that customers and employees viewed the 
plaintiff ’s combination of articles associated with different religions as 
mocking the symbolism of those religious articles.243 Despite the initial 
conversation with management, the plaintiff continued to wear all of his 
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religious attire to work, prompting various disciplinary actions and  
additional meetings with management.244 In one meeting, an assistant 
manager explained to the plaintiff that as a Catholic, she and other members 
of her religion were offended that he would wear a kaffiyeh along with a 
priest’s shirt, especially during the season of Lent.245 When the plaintiff 
reported for work later that evening wearing the prohibited attire,  
Wal-Mart terminated his employment.246 
In granting Wal-Mart summary judgment, the district court concluded 
Wal-Mart had proven it could not accommodate the plaintiff without 
suffering undue hardship.247 Because his religious expression was inconsistent 
with Wal-Mart’s image, allowing the plaintiff to continue wearing his 
religious attire would threaten Wal-Mart’s relationship with customers and 
employees.248 The court noted that in order to both accommodate the 
plaintiff and erase the adverse consequences to Wal-Mart’s business from 
individuals offended by his attire, Wal-Mart would have “had to isolate [the] 
plaintiff from both customers and other employees.”249 Unlike in Birdi and 
Brown, where the employers offered to transfer the plaintiffs to other 
existing positions outside of only customer view, Wal-Mart would have had 
to create a new position outside of both customers’ and other employees’ 
views to accommodate the Lorenz plaintiff.250 The court concluded that 
requiring Wal-Mart to form an entirely new position for the plaintiff 
“would have imposed more than a de minimus [sic] cost” on the company.251 
B. Cases Favoring Religion over Image 
In contrast to cases favoring corporate image over religious expression, 
courts siding with employees tend to focus on how a religious accommodation 
that conflicts with corporate image actually harms an employer, as opposed 
to whether the accommodation would in fact conflict with a company’s 
image. Banks v. Service America Corp.252 was one of the first cases to reject an 
image-based claim of undue hardship. In that case, Service America operated 
a cafeteria at a General Motors (GM) manufacturing plant, “serv[ing] meals 
 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at *10. 
248 Id.  
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. 
252 952 F. Supp. 703 (D. Kan. 1996). 
  
734 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 699 
 
to GM employees in an operation similar to a fast food business.”253 Because 
Service America received a significant portion of its business from the GM 
cafeteria, it valued GM’s satisfaction with its services.254 The plaintiffs, two 
Service America employees, expressed their Christian beliefs by greeting 
GM food service customers with phrases such as “God bless you” and 
“Praise the Lord.”255 After twenty to twenty-five GM employees, including 
GM’s liaison to Service America, complained about the plaintiffs’ religious 
greetings, Service America warned the men to stop making such  
comments.256 The men refused to comply and were subsequently terminated.257 
Service America moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’  
religious accommodation claim, arguing in part that accommodating their 
religious expression would have constituted undue hardship in light of the 
numerous complaints the company received from a major customer.258 The 
record contains no reference to any particular image Service America hoped 
to project, though it is clear the company terminated the plaintiffs out of 
concern that their actions would offend customers, thereby adversely 
affecting its relationship with GM.259 The district court disagreed with 
Service America, reasoning that twenty to twenty-five complaints over a 
three-month period “presented no material problem,” given that Service 
America served 2000 to 3000 GM employees daily.260 The court noted that 
“[a]n employer does not sustain its burden of proof merely by showing that 
accommodation would be bothersome or disruptive of operating routine. An 
employer’s costs of accommodation must mean present undue hardship, as 
distinguished from anticipated or multiplied hardship.”261 Unlike in U.S.F. 
Logistics, the court downplayed the significance of the customer complaints, 
contending that the record revealed “no evidence of polarization between 
Christian customers and other customers, any legitimate fear that plaintiffs 
might favor those with similar religious beliefs in performing their jobs, or 
evidence that plaintiffs’ religious practices adversely affected their job 
performances.”262 Although the court purported to apply the de minimis 
standard, its apparent disregard for the customer complaints suggests it 
used a heightened burden. 
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In EEOC v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc.,263 the court again focused 
on the harm caused by the conflict between religious expression and corporate 
image, rather than on the conflict itself. In accordance with his Kemetic 
religion, the Red Robin plaintiff had two, quarter-inch-wide tattoos  
encircling his wrists.264 Written in Coptic, the tattoos translated in English 
read, “My Father Ra is Lord. I am the son who exists of his Father; I am the 
Father who exists of his son.”265 Red Robin permitted the plaintiff to work 
as a server with his tattoos uncovered for approximately six months, but 
when he transferred to another location, his new managers ordered him to 
cover the tattoos in accordance with Red Robin’s grooming policy.266 The 
plaintiff refused, claiming it was a sin for him to intentionally cover his 
tattoos.267 Red Robin subsequently terminated the plaintiff ’s employment, 
and the EEOC brought suit on his behalf thereafter.268 
Red Robin moved for summary judgment, arguing in part that exempting 
the plaintiff from the restaurant’s appearance standards would constitute 
undue hardship because his tattoos conflicted with the company’s family-
friendly image.269 This was precisely the same argument that permitted the 
restaurant in Sambo’s to deny a managerial position to a practicing Sikh, 
even though that employee claimed his religion prohibited him from 
shaving his beard.270 The only evidence Red Robin submitted to support its 
position was a company profile and customer study suggesting that Red 
Robin “seeks to present a family-oriented and kid-friendly image.”271 Red 
Robin otherwise relied entirely on case authority from outside the Ninth 
Circuit, whose law governed the case, focusing primarily on Cloutier.272 The 
court acknowledged that Cloutier was “well-reasoned,” but stated it was 
nevertheless obligated to follow Ninth Circuit precedent requiring “proof of 
actual imposition on coworkers or disruption of the work routine” to 
establish undue hardship.273 Noting that there was no evidence that any 
customer complained about the plaintiff ’s tattoos, the Red Robin court 
reasoned that the tattoo’s small size and obscure language suggested few 
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customers noticed or understood the tattoos.274 The court rejected the 
company profile and customer study as inappropriate summary judgment 
evidence, because Red Robin failed to present any evidence that visible tattoos 
were inconsistent with its goals or that customers specifically shared the 
perception of Red Robin as a family-oriented and kid-friendly restaurant.275 
In the court’s view, Red Robin presented only hypothetical hardship rather 
than evidence of actual hardship.276 Following the court’s denial of summary 
judgment, Red Robin agreed to pay the plaintiff $150,000 and make  
“substantial policy and procedural changes” to settle the case.277 
One year later, EEOC v. Alamo Rent-a-Car LLC278 became the first  
major case in which the plaintiff prevailed on summary judgment over an 
employer’s claim of image-related undue hardship. The EEOC brought suit 
on behalf of a Muslim employee, who was fired by Alamo after refusing to 
remove her head covering while working at the car rental counter.279 Alamo 
maintained a “Dress Smart Policy,” which “promoted a favorable first 
impression with customers” and “prohibited employees from wearing 
certain clothing and accessories.”280 When the employee requested to wear a 
head covering during the Muslim holiday of Ramadan, Alamo responded 
that she could wear the head covering while working in the back office but 
must remove it when at the rental counter in customer view.281 Contrary to 
her employer’s instruction, the employee repeatedly wore the head covering 
while working at the rental counter.282 Alamo subsequently fired her for 
violating company rules, prompting the EEOC to file suit on the employee’s 
behalf.283 
The district court granted the EEOC’s motion for summary judgment, 
holding that Alamo could not prove undue hardship as a matter of law.284 
Like the employers in Sambo’s, Cloutier, and other cases upholding image 
over religion, Alamo argued that “any deviation from [its] carefully cultivated 
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image is a definite burden.”285 But, in the court’s view, this argument 
“simply assume[d] the question of cost” without supplying any factual basis 
of the hardship that Alamo would have incurred if it permitted the employee 
to wear the head covering at the rental counter.286 Furthermore, the  
employee’s supervisor admitted that he did not believe permitting her to 
wear the head covering would “negatively impact customer expectations,”  
although he suggested that allowing this one exception could affect the 
“efficiency of Alamo’s operations by opening the door for other employees to 
violate the company uniform policy.”287 The court rejected this “floodgates” 
argument as speculative and fundamentally at odds with Title VII  
protections.288 The court entered summary judgment against Alamo on the 
issue of liability, and a jury awarded the employee $287,640 in damages.289 
In United States v. New York City Transit Authority, a rare pattern and 
practice case, the Department of Justice accused the Transit Authority of 
“pursuing policies or practices that discriminate[d] against employees whose 
religious beliefs require[d] them to wear certain headwear, such as turbans 
and khimars.”290 The Transit Authority maintained a dress code that 
prohibited passenger-service employees from wearing headwear other than 
depot logo caps.291 The Transit Authority rejected as unreasonable a request 
that employees be allowed to wear turbans and khimars in the same blue 
color as their uniforms and affix the Transit Authority logo to the front 
pocket or collars of their uniform shirts rather than to their headwear.292 
Relying on Cloutier, the Transit Authority claimed it was entitled to  
summary judgment, because Title VII does not require an accommodation 
that would cause an employer to cede control of its public image.293 The 
Transit Authority court rejected this argument, reasoning that Cloutier 
involved a request for an outright exemption from a dress code and that 
“there was no question that granting such an exception would adversely 
affect the employer’s public image.”294 By contrast, the Transit Authority 
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failed to provide any proof that placing the logo on a shirt rather than on 
headgear would adversely affect its business, particularly since the Transit 
Authority runs all of New York City’s subways and most of its busses and 
therefore “does not face the ‘highly competitive business environment’ that 
justified upholding the grooming requirements in cases [involving commercial 
businesses].”295 The court observed that the causal relationship between the 
exemption and damage to public image was “not intuitively obvious, as it 
was in the grooming cases.”296 The court further questioned whether the 
Transit Authority could prove undue hardship at trial, since the evidence 
would come primarily from the Transit Authority’s own employees or 
retained experts and therefore would be “somewhat speculative in nature.”297 
Following the denial of its summary judgment motion, the Transit Authority 
settled the case for $184,500 and agreed, as part of the settlement, to revise 
its dress code policy to allow employees working in public contact positions 
to wear religious headwear without the Transit Authority logo attached.298 
Most recently, the EEOC has taken aim at the famously image-
conscious clothing retailer Abercrombie & Fitch. Since 2008, the EEOC 
has sued Abercrombie four times for failing to accommodate applicants and 
employees who could not comply with the company’s “Look Policy” for 
religious reasons.299 Abercrombie’s marketing strategy seeks to create an 
“in-store experience” for customers that perfectly matches Abercrombie’s 
vision of each of its brands.300 Abercrombie considers customers’ in-store 
experience to be its main form of marketing, as it uses almost no television, 
print, or radio advertising.301 Sales associates are expected to “reinforce the 
aspirational lifestyles represented by the brands and are a central element in 
creating the atmospheres of the stores.”302 To ensure that employees properly 
and consistently model Abercrombie’s brands, the company maintains a 
“Look Policy,” which gives employees extremely specific guidelines regarding 
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their appearance and the clothing they are expected to wear at work.303 The 
Look Policy has undergone various changes over the years, at times requiring 
employees to wear clothes similar to those sold in Abercrombie stores, 
requiring male employees to be clean-shaven, requiring employees to wear 
specific types of shoes, and prohibiting necklaces, bracelets, caps, piercings, 
nail polish, and heavy makeup.304  
In Abercrombie I, the EEOC brought suit on behalf of an Abercrombie 
employee, who resigned after Abercrombie denied her request for an 
exemption from the Look Policy.305 Abercrombie initially hired the employee 
as a salesperson or “model” in its Abercrombie & Fitch store but subsequently 
promoted her to a manager-in-training position at one of its Hollister 
stores.306 At that time, the Hollister style consisted of “‘ripped-up jeans, a 
little revealing, sporty, California, beach style, laid back,’ and was sexy, 
form-fitting, and designed to show off body contours and draw attention to 
the wearer.”307 Following her promotion, the employee converted to the 
Apostolic religion and began adhering to the faith’s regulations regarding 
dress, including wearing “only skirts that fell below the knee, and shirts with 
sleeves that came to the forearm.”308 Abercrombie offered to let the employee 
wear jeans instead of skirts or short skirts with leggings underneath to cover 
her legs, or look in other stores “for skirts that would both meet her  
religious requirements and be consistent with the Hollister style.”309 The 
employee rejected each proposed accommodation and ultimately resigned 
her employment in lieu of termination.310 
Abercrombie moved for summary judgment, arguing the accommodation 
that the employee sought would have imposed undue hardship by compro-
mising the Hollister brand.311 Abercrombie supported its argument with 
testimony from several employees as well as an expert witness who testified 
that inconsistent or off-brand customer experiences could damage the 
Hollister brand and detrimentally impact sales.312 The court concluded that 
Abercrombie failed to demonstrate that, as a matter of law, it would have 
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suffered more than a de minimis hardship by accommodating the employee.313 
Although Abercrombie’s evidence was insufficient to warrant summary 
judgment, the company ultimately prevailed at the jury trial.314 
In Abercrombie II, the EEOC alleged that Abercrombie failed to hire a 
female applicant as a sales model because she wore a headscarf in accordance 
with her Muslim religion.315 Abercrombie submitted much of the same 
evidence in this latter case that it relied upon in Abercrombie I, including 
both lay and expert testimony stating that exempting this particular job 
applicant from the Look Policy would constitute undue hardship.316  
Abercrombie executives uniformly testified that allowing exceptions to the 
Look Policy negatively impacts the brand and its sales.317 Abercrombie’s 
expert witness likewise testified that deviations from the Look Policy are 
“identity distorting,” would appear “off-brand” to Abercrombie’s target 
market, and could potentially cause consumer confusion and “decreased 
brand preference and value perceptions for the Abercrombie brand,” 
resulting in “a decreased ability to effectively market to its target customers 
and establish strong emotional bonds with them[,] a decreased ability to 
retain existing customer[s,] and increased costs of marketing and merchandising 
its products successfully.”318 
The Abercrombie II court not only denied Abercrombie’s motion for 
summary judgment but also granted summary judgment to the EEOC on 
the issue of liability, finding as a matter of law that accommodating the 
applicant would not have caused more than de minimis cost to Abercrombie.319 
The court discounted Abercrombie’s lay testimony because none of the 
witnesses conducted studies nor cited examples to support Abercrombie’s 
claim that accommodating the applicant would negatively impact the brand, 
its sales, or other employees’ compliance with the Look Policy.320 The court 
also rejected the testimony of Abercrombie’s expert witness for the same 
reason, observing that the expert “made no effort . . . to collect or analyze 
data to corroborate his opinion.”321 The court noted that Abercrombie had 
previously granted eight or nine headscarf exceptions, the impact of which 
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the expert failed to consider in assessing the potential consequences of 
granting an exception in the instant case.322 Accordingly, Abercrombie’s past 
provision of headwear exceptions to its Look Policy undermined the 
company’s claim of undue hardship because it could not show the past 
exceptions adversely affected its corporate image.323 On appeal, the Tenth 
Circuit reversed the district court on other grounds, holding that  
Abercrombie was entitled to summary judgment because the job applicant 
failed to notify the company that she needed an accommodation.324 
In Abercrombie III, the EEOC prevailed on summary judgment on its 
claim that Abercrombie discriminated against a Muslim job applicant 
because of her religion.325 Although the applicant received a passing score in 
her interviews, Abercrombie did not offer her a position because it deter-
mined her headscarf was “inconsistent with the ‘Abercrombie look.’”326 As in 
the prior cases, Abercrombie presented testimony from several executives 
stating that granting an exception would disrupt the company’s careful 
branding efforts and hurt store performance.327 The EEOC countered that, 
like in Abercrombie II, the company’s evidence in this case was speculative 
because it did not offer any studies demonstrating a correlation between 
Look Policy exemptions and either customer confusion or decreased sales.328 
Abercrombie’s Director of Stores testified that because a large number of 
variables factor into store performance, one would be “‘guessing essentially’ 
in determining if a correlation exists between any one factor and a drop in 
sales.”329 
Noting that the Ninth Circuit requires “heightened proof of the  
hardship alleged,” the district court discredited the executives’ testimony, 
even though they had shown “some correlation, based on their personal 
experience, among Look Policy compliance, store sales, and brand image,” 
because none of the witnesses were able to “isolate its effects or the magnitude 
of such effects on store sales or brand image.”330 The court reasoned that 
this “dearth of proof” conflicted with the employer’s obligation to prove 
actual imposition or disruption rather than a de minimis, hypothetical, or 
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“merely conceivable” hardship.331 In the court’s view, Abercrombie’s  
evidence afforded “little basis” upon which a reasonable jury could conclude 
that the company would be unduly burdened by granting the applicant an 
exception to its Look Policy.332 
In Abercrombie IV, the court granted the EEOC’s motion for summary 
judgment as to liability on its claim that Abercrombie discriminated against 
a Muslim employee by discharging her for refusing to remove her  
headscarf.333 Abercrombie took a slightly different approach in responding 
to the EEOC’s summary judgment motion, arguing that the Ninth Circuit 
did not require proof of “economic harm to prove undue hardship nor that 
such proof be proffered with specificity or exactitude.”334 Abercrombie 
offered lay testimony from numerous employees who testified that, based on 
their personal experiences, “compliance with the Look Policy is key to  
Abercrombie’s success and/or that deviations from the policy ‘detract from 
the in-store experience and negatively affect [the] brand.’”335  
The court rejected Abercrombie’s evidence, reasoning that none of the 
witnesses were able to “provide a more concrete basis than that it was their 
‘belief ’ based on ‘personal experience’ that such harms result.”336 The court 
observed that Abercrombie’s evidence provided “only a tenuous, potential 
connection between the Look Policy and undue hardship, as ‘other’ store 
issues contributed to declining sales.”337 As in the earlier cases, the Abercrombie 
IV court cited the absence of any report, survey, or complaint as detrimental 
to Abercrombie’s undue hardship claim.338 The court was particularly 
skeptical of Abercrombie’s position because the Muslim sales associate had 
worn the headscarf on the job for four months without any complaints, 
disruption, or noticeable effect on sales.339 Once again, Abercrombie’s 
evidence was deemed insufficient to withstand summary judgment.340 
Although Abercrombie’s recent defeats in federal court have not  
deterred the clothing retailer from continuing to enforce its Look Policy, it 
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agreed to several measures to facilitate religious exceptions to the policy as 
part of a consolidated settlement of the Abercrombie III and Abercrombie IV 
cases, including “creat[ing] an appeals process for denials of religious 
accommodation requests, inform[ing] applicants during interviews that 
accommodations to the ‘Look Policy’ may be available, and incorporat[ing] 
headscarf scenarios into all manager training.”341 Abercrombie also agreed to 
pay $71,000 to the two Muslim complainants in those cases.342  
C. The EEOC’s Interpretation of the Case Law 
The EEOC has long pushed for greater religious freedom in the workplace 
through its expansive interpretation of Title VII’s religious accommodation 
provision.343 It is hardly surprising, then, that in recent years the EEOC has 
relied exclusively on cases favoring religion over image—while completely 
ignoring contrary cases—in formulating its guidance on image-related 
hardships. In 2005, the EEOC issued a “fact sheet” in response to discrimi-
nation charges based on religion and national origin following the attacks of 
September 11, 2001.344 The fact sheet contains various hypothetical situations 
and the EEOC’s position as to how an employer should respond in each 
scenario. Two of the example questions implicate corporate image concerns: 
[Question:] Narinder, a South Asian man who wears a Sikh turban, applies 
for a position as a cashier at XYZ Discount Goods. XYZ fears Narinder’s 
religious attire will make customers uncomfortable. What should XYZ do? 
[Answer:] XYZ should not deny Narinder the job due to notions of customer 
preferences about religious attire. That would be unlawful. It would be the 
same as refusing to hire Narinder because he is a Sikh. . . . It is important 
to hire people based on their qualifications rather than on perceptions about 
their religion, race or national origin.345 
This hypothetical scenario is consistent with Red Robin in that it rejects 
customer preference as a legitimate basis for withholding a religious  
accommodation. However, the EEOC’s position in this fact sheet is at odds 
 
341 Press Release, EEOC, Abercrombie & Fitch Settles Two Pending EEOC Religious Dis-
crimination Suits (Sept. 23, 2013), available at http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/9-23-13c.cfm. 
342 Id. 
343 See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
344  Questions and Answers About Employer Responsibilities Concerning the Employment of Muslims, 
Arabs, South Asians, and Sikhs, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www. 
eeoc.gov/facts/backlash-employer.html (last modified Mar. 21, 2005), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
6KEG-XMAA. 
345 Id. 
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with the holdings in Sambo’s, Cloutier, Lorenz, and other cases in which the 
courts upheld the denial of accommodations based on what they deemed as 
the employer’s legitimate concern about customer reactions.  
The second scenario from the EEOC fact sheet also rejects degradation 
of corporate image as a conceivable undue hardship: 
[Question:] Susan is an experienced clerical worker who wears a hijab (head 
scarf ) in conformance with her Muslim beliefs. XYZ Temps places Susan in 
a long-term assignment with one of its clients. The client contacts XYZ and 
requests that it notify Susan that she must remove her hijab while working 
at the front desk, or that XYZ assign another person to Susan’s position. 
According to the client, Susan’s religious attire violates its dress code and 
presents the “wrong image.” Should XYZ comply with its client’s request? 
[Answer:] XYZ Temps may not comply with this client request without 
violating Title VII. The client would also violate Title VII if it made Susan 
remove her hijab or changed her duties to keep her out of public view. 
Therefore, XYZ should strongly advise against this course of action.  
Notions about customer preference real or perceived do not establish undue 
hardship, so the client should make an exception to its dress code to let  
Susan wear her hijab during front desk duty as a religious accommodation. 
If the client does not withdraw the request, XYZ should place Susan in  
another assignment at the same rate of pay and decline to assign another 
worker to the client.346 
The EEOC’s response to this second hypothetical scenario is consistent 
with the Alamo Rent-a-Car court’s rejection of the notion that an employer 
can remove a frontline employee from public view if the employee’s  
religious expression conflicts with the employer’s corporate image. Again, 
however, the EEOC’s position on the employer’s responsibility fails to 
acknowledge that in other cases, such as Birdi and Brown, reassignment to 
positions with no public contact was upheld as reasonable. 
The latest version of the EEOC Compliance Manual contains similar 
hypotheticals to those from the EEOC fact sheet.347 These hypotheticals 
show that the EEOC puts little stock in claims of image-based hardship. 
Although these kinds of agency materials only have the “power to persuade” 
judicial decisions,348 the EEOC’s position nonetheless influences both how 
 
346 Id. 
347 EEOC, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 12 (2008), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
policy/docs/religion.html. Examples 14 and 47 are factually similar to the scenarios from the 
EEOC fact sheet referenced above. Id.  
348 Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (citation omitted).  
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courts decide discrimination charges and, consequently, how employers and 
employees view religious accommodation issues under Title VII. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND POTENTIAL IMPACT 
As the diversity of religious beliefs and practices in the American workplace 
grows, conflicts between religious expression and corporate image will likely 
increase in both frequency and intensity. Unfortunately, case law offers 
little, if any, practical guidance; indeed, the cases highlighted in Part IV 
illustrate how inconsistent courts can be in weighing religious accommodations 
against corporate image. Costco, Jiffy Lube, and Wal-Mart could deny 
religious accommodations that conflicted with their respective images, but 
when Red Robin, Alamo Rent-a-Car, and Abercrombie & Fitch did the 
same, their actions were deemed discriminatory. Obviously, what constitutes 
undue hardship can vary from case to case. But, even though accommodation 
law may not lend itself to bright-line tests or one-size-fits-all solutions, 
employers and employees deserve more than the vague and ultimately 
unhelpful “fact-specific inquiry” or “totality of circumstances” rubric that 
dominates today’s jurisprudence. When courts well-versed in the nuances of 
Title VII reach conflicting decisions in factually similar cases, it is unrealistic 
to expect employers to fare any better. Aside from possible appellate 
reversal (or perhaps a critical law review article), courts have little incentive 
to rethink their approach to claims of image-related undue hardship. By 
contrast, employers stand to lose much more from inconsistent case law 
through litigation costs, verdict payouts, or reputational damage. The 
following recommendations are intended to generate more consistent 
decisions that will in turn provide meaningful direction to employers and 
employees faced with religious accommodation issues. 
A. A True De Minimis Standard 
To generate more consistent case law, courts analyzing claims of  
image-based undue hardship should apply a true de minimis standard. 
When the Supreme Court announced in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison 
that an employer need not provide an accommodation that would impose 
more than de minimis cost, it quite deliberately set the bar as low as possible 
for employers to prove undue hardship.349 Translated from Latin, “de 
minimis” means “of the least.”350 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “de minimis” 
 
349 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). 
350 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 524 (10th ed. 2014). 
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as “trifling,” “negligible,” and “so insignificant that a court may overlook it in 
deciding an issue or case,”351 while courts characterize the standard as “not a 
heavy burden,”352 “minimal,”353 “very low,”354 “extremely low,”355 and “neither 
onerous, nor intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.”356 The Hardison 
dissent interpreted the de minimis standard as so low that employers “need 
not grant even the most minor special privilege to religious observers to 
enable them to follow their faith.”357 Religious freedom proponents have 
echoed this concern, pushing for legislation that replaces the de minimis 
standard with a more demanding “significant difficulty or expense” test.358 
Although most religious accommodation decisions cite Hardison’s de 
minimis language, adherence to this standard can vary from court to 
court.359 Not surprisingly, courts favoring image over religion tend to 
interpret the standard quite literally: they treat the standard as so low that 
they focus on whether there is an inconsistency between the accommodation 
and the corporate image that could cause the employer to lose control over 
its image, rather than on whether the accommodation itself has or will cause 
economic loss, customer complaints, or other adverse consequences beyond 
loss of control. For example, in Cloutier, the First Circuit did not concern 
itself with whether the plaintiff ’s appearance adversely affected Costco’s 
business—the evidence showed there were no customer complaints.360 
Instead, the court focused on the notion that the plaintiff ’s facial jewelry 
 
351 Id. 
352 Dupree v. UHAB-Sterling St. Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., No. 10-1894, 2012 WL 3288234, at 
*4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2012). 
353 Faul v. Potter, 355 F. App’x. 527, 528 (2d Cir. 2009).  
354 Cannon v. Burkybile, No. 99-4623, 2002 WL 448988, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2002). 
355 Franklin v. Astrue, No. 11-1615, 2012 WL 3059407, at *2 (W.D. Wash. July 25, 2012). 
356 Beyer v. Cnty. of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 
357 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 87 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
358 See, e.g., Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2013, S. 3686, 112th Cong. § 2(3) (2012) 
(“In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), the Supreme Court held that an 
employer could deny an employee’s request for religious accommodation based on any burden 
greater than a de minimis burden on the employer, and thus narrowed the scope of protection of 
title VII against religious discrimination in employment, contrary to the intent of Congress.”); see 
also id. at § 4(a)(3) (“[W]ith respect to the practice of wearing religious clothing or a religious 
hairstyle, or of taking time off for a religious reason, an accommodation of such a religious 
practice . . . shall be considered to impose an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s 
business only if the accommodation imposes a significant difficulty or expense on the conduct of 
the employer’s business.”). 
359 See Sara L. Silbiger, Heaven Can Wait: Judicial Interpretation of Title VII’s Religious  
Accommodation Requirement Since Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 839, 
847 (1985) (citing cases involving Seventh Day Adventists’ religious objections to mandatory 
payment of union dues as examples of courts demanding a higher evidentiary burden from 
employers). 
360 Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 135 (1st Cir. 2004). 
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genuinely conflicted with Costco’s professional public image, holding that 
such conflict amounted to undue hardship by interfering with the company’s 
ability to project the image of its choosing.361 Likewise, the Sambo’s, Johnson, 
Hussein, Birdi, and Brown decisions make no mention of customer  
complaints or any other evidence of how an accommodation would adversely 
impact corporate image. Instead, the courts relied on the fact that the 
requested religious accommodations conflicted with the company’s images, 
concluding this conflict itself imposed more than de minimis cost by 
jeopardizing the companies’ ability to control their images. 
By contrast, in cases favoring religion over image, courts tend to reject 
the notion that conflict itself can constitute undue hardship and instead 
focus on whether there is some cost to the employer beyond loss of control 
over its image. In a sense, these courts pay lip service to the de minimis 
standard, while in reality imposing a de minimis-plus burden that is more 
demanding than the Supreme Court precedent allows. For example, the 
Banks court largely ignored the fact that twenty to twenty-five customers 
complained about the plaintiffs’ religious expression in holding that “[t]he 
record does not compel the conclusion that plaintiffs’ greetings inflicted on 
Service America anything more than a de minimis burden, or that a refusal 
to prevent plaintiffs from extending such greetings was likely to cause 
undue future hardship to defendant.”362 Similarly, the Red Robin court 
downplayed the conflict between the employer’s family-friendly image and 
the employee’s religious tattoos, instead focusing on the tattoos’ small size 
and foreign language scripts in speculating that “few” customers would 
notice them.363 In the court’s view, the risk of an adverse response to the 
tattoos by a few customers did not impose more than a de minimis cost.364 
Unless and until Congress legislates a more onerous burden, the de minimis 
standard remains the proper measure of undue hardship. Correctly  
interpreted, this standard means that to establish undue hardship, an 
employer need only prove an accommodation would impose more than 
trifling or minimal cost. An accommodation at odds with corporate image 
diminishes a company’s control over its image. Given the importance—and 
fragility—of corporate image, courts must recognize that this loss of control 
itself can impose more than a de minimis cost to a company. Accordingly, 
proper application of the de minimis standard mandates that this inquiry be 
 
361 Id. at 135-36. 
362 Banks v. Serv. Am. Corp., 952 F. Supp. 703, 709 (D. Kan. 1996). 
363 EEOC v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc., No. 04-1291, 2005 WL 2090677, at *4 (W.D. 
Wash. Aug. 29, 2005). 
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the starting point of a court’s analysis. Only if the conflict itself between a 
proposed religious accommodation and the company’s image does not 
impose more than de minimis cost should the court then examine the 
accommodation’s secondary consequences, such as customer complaints, loss 
of business, or reputational harm. To conform with Supreme Court precedent, 
courts must apply a true de minimis standard in analyzing such consequences 
to ensure employers incur no more than minimal damage to their image. 
B. A Uniform Standard of Proof 
A second way to establish a more consistent body of religious accommo-
dation case law is mandating that courts apply a uniform evidentiary 
standard for establishing undue hardship. Because the Supreme Court has 
never weighed in on what an employer must prove to establish “more than 
de minimis cost,”365 the level of proof varies from circuit to circuit. The 
Ninth Circuit sits on one end of the spectrum, having adopted a heightened 
standard requiring proof of “actual imposition” or “disruption of the work 
routine”; hypothetical or conceivable hardships are not competent evidence 
of undue hardship.366 On the other end of the spectrum is the Fifth Circuit, 
which does not require proof that the employer actually incurred costs to 
demonstrate undue hardship, but instead recognizes that “[t]he mere 
possibility of an adverse impact . . . is sufficient to constitute an undue 
hardship.”367 The First Circuit falls somewhere in the middle: it is skeptical 
of hypothetical hardships but allows an employer to prove undue hardship 
without actually having undertaken an accommodation by permitting the 
court to “examin[e] the specific hardships imposed by specific accommodation 
proposals.”368 Unsurprisingly, these disparate standards of proof among the 
circuit courts contribute significantly to the dissonance of the religious 
accommodation case law. 
The Ninth Circuit’s requirement of actual imposition or disruption 
makes little sense, particularly in the context of image-based hardships, 
where a single employee’s actions or appearance can jeopardize an entire 
 
365 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). 
366 Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 
589 F.2d 397, 402 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Undue hardship means something greater than hardship. 
Undue hardship cannot be proved by assumptions nor by opinions based on hypothetical facts. 
Even proof that employees would grumble about a particular accommodation is not enough to 
establish undue hardship.”). 
367 Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2000). 
368 Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 135 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Toledo v. 
Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1490 (10th Cir. 1989)). 
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organization’s image. Under this heightened standard, proving undue 
hardship is practically impossible for an employer unless the employer 
implements the accommodation and proves that the accommodation 
somehow damaged its business. For example, the Abercrombie III and 
Abercrombie IV courts held that Abercrombie’s lay and expert testimony 
about the prospective damage to the company’s careful branding efforts 
caused by accommodating the plaintiffs was so speculative and hypothetical 
that it failed to even raise an issue of fact as to whether  
Abercrombie would suffer undue hardship.369 The courts required  
Abercrombie to use studies, survey data, customer complaints, sales reports, 
or financial statements to prove it had already incurred undue hardship to 
survive summary judgment.370 Abercrombie could not rely on the risk of 
harm to its image to justify denying religious accommodations. Instead, to 
establish undue hardship, the courts required that Abercrombie incur such 
harm and also isolate and prove the causal connection between the  
accommodation and the damage to its corporate image. 
Requiring that an employer suffer hardship to prove hardship is  
inherently unfair. For instance, in cases where a religious accommodation 
poses safety concerns, it would be ludicrous to require employers to wait 
until injury or death actually results to establish undue hardship. Indeed, 
several courts have rejected this proposition outright. In EEOC v. GEO 
Group, Inc., the Third Circuit upheld the employer’s refusal to allow Muslim 
prison guards to wear headscarves out of purely prospective concerns that 
the headscarves could be used to smuggle in contraband, to conceal the 
identity of the wearer, or as a weapon against a prison employee in an 
attack.371 The court noted that even though there were no reports of these 
types of incidents, the employer “should not have to wait for a khimar 
[headscarf ] to actually be used in an unsafe or risky manner, risking harm to 
employees or inmates, before this foreseeable risk is considered in  
determining undue hardship.”372 In Finnie v. Lee County, the court held that 
a detention officer’s request to wear skirts in accordance with her religion 
imposed an undue hardship as a matter of law, even though there was no 
evidence to substantiate the employer’s claim that wearing a skirt could cause 
safety and security risks.373 The court observed that “to carry a burden of 
showing undue hardship, Defendants do not even need to prove that a skirt 
 
369 Abercrombie IV, 966 F. Supp. 2d 949, 964-65 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Abercrombie III, No. 10-3911, 
2013 WL 1435290, at *14-15 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2013). 
370 Abercrombie IV, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 963; Abercrombie III, 2013 WL 1435290, at *14-15. 
371 616 F.3d 265, 274 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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373 907 F. Supp. 2d 750, 781 (N.D. Miss. 2012). 
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has . . . actually caused such safety and security problems. Instead, the 
Defendants must show safety and security risks.”374 There is no reason that 
courts should analyze image cases any differently from safety cases. A 
company’s image can take years to build and only moments to destroy. 
Because image-related cases can involve potentially serious consequences, 
courts should focus on the risks that an accommodation poses to the  
employer’s corporate image rather than the accommodation’s actual  
consequences. 
The First Circuit’s approach to analyzing claims of undue hardship 
seems most consistent with Supreme Court precedent. While less accepting 
of hypothetical hardships than the Fifth Circuit, the First Circuit acknowledges 
employers should not have to actually incur hardship to prove undue 
hardship. Instead, the focus should be on how a specific proposed  
accommodation would impose a specific hardship.375 This approach is 
supported by Hardison, in which the Supreme Court did not require proof 
of actual imposition or disruption but instead focused on how possible  
accommodations could potentially create undue hardship.376 The First 
Circuit’s approach seems particularly well-suited to image cases. Given the 
fragility of corporate image, it makes sense for courts to analyze the risk of 
specific hardship that might result from an accommodation rather than 
requiring an employer to actually incur and then prove such hardship. 
 
374 Id.; see also McCarter v. Harris Cnty., Tex., No. 04-4159, 2006 WL 1281087, at *5 (S.D. 
Tex. May 5, 2006) (finding that evidence that the plaintiff–employee worked for two years in a 
skirt without a safety incident did not undermine defendant’s undue hardship claim, as the law 
does not require proof that the defendant actually incurred costs to demonstrate undue hardship); 
EEOC v. Oak-Rite Mfg. Corp., No. 99-1962, 2001 WL 1168156, at *14 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 27, 2001) 
(holding that the defendant–employer was not required to prove conclusively that the plaintiff–
employee would be injured if allowed to wear an ankle-length skirt instead of pants in the 
defendant’s manufacturing plant); Favero v. Huntsville Ind. Sch. Dist., 939 F. Supp. 1281, 1293 
(S.D. Tex. 1996), aff ’d mem., 110 F.3d 793 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that Title VII does not require 
employers to deny accommodation requests only if they are certain in advance that honoring the 
request would cause an undue hardship). 
375 See Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 135 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that “it 
is possible for an employer to prove undue hardship without actually having undertaken any of the 
possible accommodations” (quoting Draper v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th 
Cir. 1975))). 
376 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 77 (1977) (finding that TWA 
“made reasonable efforts to accommodate” the plaintiff and that it could not have implemented the 
plaintiff ’s suggested alternatives without undue hardship involving breach of the seniority 
provisions of the airline employees’ collective bargaining agreement). 
  
2015] Image Is Everything 751 
 
C. Greater Employer Deference 
A final recommendation is that courts grant employers greater deference 
in proving image-based undue hardships. Employers know their own brands 
far better than anyone else and, therefore, are best positioned to explain the 
nuances of their image and how an accommodation might conflict or 
interfere with that image. Because image is among a corporation’s most 
valuable assets, companies devote millions of dollars and countless hours to 
building and maintaining an image that appeals to a variety of stakeholders. 
They hire marketing firms, strategists, consultants, branding analysts, public 
relations experts, graphic designers, and organizational behaviorists—all 
with the singular purpose of building an image that will generate the 
consumer commitment, loyalty, passion, and trust necessary for long-term 
success. Given their intimate knowledge of their own branding efforts, 
employers can best articulate how a certain religious accommodation might 
interfere with their corporate image. The fact that the most qualified 
witnesses often work for the defendant should not automatically diminish 
the credibility of the evidence, as some courts seem to suggest.377 Assuming 
an employer’s evidence of hardship holds up against traditional discrediting 
mechanisms such as cross-examination and rebuttal testimony, courts should 
afford such evidence greater weight in recognition that the company is in the 
best position to explain how an accommodation would interfere with its image.  
A second reason for greater employer deference is that proving an  
accommodation’s negative effects on the employer’s image can be extraordi-
narily difficult and expensive. Absent a customer complaint about an 
employee’s religious expression, it is almost impossible for an employer to 
prove an accommodation damaged its image.378 Unlike other types of 
hardship, damage to image is almost always intangible and, consequently, 
very difficult to measure. It is easy to calculate the impact of paying  
 
377 See, e.g., Abercrombie IV, 966 F. Supp. 2d 949, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (noting with disfavor 
that “Abercrombie only offers unsubstantiated opinion testimony of its own employees to support 
its claim of undue hardship”); Abercrombie III, No. 10-3911, 2013 WL 1435290, at *14 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 9, 2013) (criticizing that “Abercrombie offers only the seemingly speculative assertion on the 
part of its executives that the correlation [between failure to comply with the Look Policy and 
consumer confusion or decreased sales] exists”); United States v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., No. 04-
4237, 2010 WL 3855191, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010) (finding that “[a]lthough defendants may 
be able to introduce evidence that these hardships will result, that evidence comes largely from 
defendants’ own employees or retained experts and is somewhat speculative in nature”). 
378 Even then, as Banks illustrates, customer complaints alone may not be enough to prove 
undue hardship. See Banks v. Serv. Am. Corp., 952 F. Supp. 703, 710 (D. Kan. 1996) (“[T]he fact 
that defendant received assorted complaints . . . does not, standing alone, demonstrate that 
plaintiffs’ jobs were ‘completely incompatible’ with their practice of extending religious greetings 
to food service customers.”). 
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overtime wages to an employee who works in place of a coworker observing 
the Sabbath. But proving the adverse consequences of an employee saying 
“God bless you” to customers is far more difficult. Unless an offended 
customer actually complains, there is no clear way to measure how an 
employee’s religious expression affects customers’ buying intentions, 
commitment, loyalty, or overall perception of the business. The effect such 
expression has on how other stakeholders view an organization may be even 
more difficult to detect, although certainly no less significant.  
Measuring an accommodation’s impact is further complicated by the 
difficulty of isolating the effect of the accommodation itself from other 
variables that could jointly affect stakeholder perception. For instance, a 
customer may vow never to shop at a store again if he perceives the store as 
dirty or crowded, its prices as too high, its employees as unapproachable, or 
any combination of such factors. Perhaps an employee’s religiously mandated 
appearance or expression also contributed to the customer’s overall negative 
perception of the store. Or perhaps not. Proving the lost business was the 
result of the employee’s religious expression—independent of the other 
negative factors the customer experienced—is nearly impossible, even using 
the most advanced statistical measures. Given the difficulty of proving the 
impact of an accommodation on corporate image, courts should be open to 
other types of evidence, particularly employee testimony, to establish undue 
hardship. 
A final reason to grant employers greater deference in proving image-
based hardships is that the undue hardship standard itself supposedly 
requires so little. The de minimis burden means an employer can lawfully 
withhold an accommodation if the accommodation would impose anything 
more than a minimal cost. However, the de minimis standard is of little use 
to employers if courts automatically discount managerial testimony as 
biased or insist on “objective” evidence that an accommodation directly 
damaged a company’s bottom line.379 Although it is reasonable to require 
employers to present more than de minimis evidence of de minimis hardship, 
the level of proof should be somewhat commensurate with the level of 
hardship. Granting greater deference to employers is an effective means of 
accomplishing this objective. 
D. Potential Impact 
If implemented, the foregoing recommendations will likely produce 
more consistent judicial decisions. This result alone would go a long way 
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toward helping employers more correctly and confidently balance religious 
accommodation proposals against image concerns. Furthermore, although 
the EEOC has long been at odds with the courts in its interpretation of 
Title VII’s religious accommodation requirements, perhaps the Commission 
would feel compelled to align its regulations with a more unified case law. If 
the courts and the EEOC can present a more united front in their  
assessment of image-based undue hardship claims, employers will have a 
much better sense of when they must set aside image concerns in favor of 
religious accommodations. Employees, too, stand to benefit by having a 
clearer sense of when to push for an accommodation that conflicts with the 
employer’s image and when it may make more sense to look for another job. 
Aside from generating greater clarity, the intended effect of these  
recommendations is to afford employers greater control over their own 
image. There is no doubt employers stand to benefit if courts apply a more 
conservative de minimis standard, acknowledge hypothetical hardships, and 
grant the employer greater deference in proving its defense. Each of these 
recommendations will make it easier for employers to prove undue hardship 
in most cases. In a perfect world, an employee would never have to choose 
between her religion and her job. Unfortunately, that is not realistic. The 
cases discussed herein illustrate the conflict that can arise between an 
employee’s religious expression and a company’s image. The Supreme Court 
has made clear that when employers and employees clash over religious 
accommodations, the employer can and should prevail upon minimal proof 
of undue hardship. This principle should apply with equal, if not greater, 
force when a religious accommodation conflicts with corporate image. In 
today’s cutthroat business environment, a company’s image simply is too 
critical—and too fragile—to justify imposing anything beyond the least 
intrusive religious accommodation obligations. The recommendations 
proposed in this Article will help ensure this standard for evaluating an 
employer’s obligations to make religious accommodations remains in effect. 
CONCLUSION 
Conflicts between religious accommodation and corporate image are 
almost certain to increase in the coming years, given the growing religious 
diversity of the American workforce and the increasing prominence of 
religion in the workplace. When such conflicts arise, it is critical that both 
employers and employees have a clear sense of their rights and obligations 
under Title VII. Existing case law provides little meaningful guidance, 
because courts continue to reach conflicting decisions in factually similar 
cases. When a New York federal district court upholds a hotel’s right to 
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prohibit a bearded waiter from serving guests, while a Washington federal 
district court rules against a restaurant that fired a waiter for refusing to 
cover his tattoos, employers and employees are left to wonder when a 
religious accommodation that conflicts with corporate image might be 
required. At present, there is no definitive answer. 
Religious accommodation law is unique in that it sometimes requires 
differential or preferential treatment of employees based on religious 
beliefs. Because courts focus on Title VII as an antidiscrimination statute 
rather than an affirmative action mandate, it is unsurprising that the 
Supreme Court set the bar for establishing undue hardship as low as 
possible. In theory, the de minimis standard means an employer need not 
grant a religious accommodation if the cost of doing so is more than minimal. 
But in practice, some courts—especially in cases involving claims of image-
based hardship—make it much more difficult for employers to prove undue 
hardship by imposing a heightened standard or by demanding evidence that 
is nearly impossible to obtain. The inconsistency in the religious accommo-
dation case law is a direct consequence of these different standards. 
Because religious accommodation cases do not lend themselves to 
bright-line tests, there will always be some uncertainty as to whether an 
accommodation is required under a particular set of facts. However, the 
degree of uncertainty can be greatly reduced if courts adopt the foregoing 
recommendations, namely, courts should stay true to the de minimis 
standard, apply a uniform standard of proof, and grant employers greater 
deference in proving undue hardship. These guidelines will not only assist 
courts in striking the proper balance between religious expression and 
corporate image, but will also lead to a more consistent body of case law 
that employers and employees alike can rely on as religious accommodation 
issues in the workplace become more commonplace. 
